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In South Korea, after extensive national Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission fact-finding and recommendations on a range of atrocities, 
survivor-participants confronted minimal government implementation 
efforts.' They saw in 2010 "institutionalize[d] attempts to frustrate the goals 
and functionality of [the] truth commission.,,2 
• Fred T. Korematsu Professor of Law and Social Justice, William S. Richardson School 
of Law, University ofHawai'i . 
.. J.D. 2015, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawai'i . 
... J.D. 2015, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawai'i. 
The authors thank Eve Yeung for her valuable research contributions. 
I See infra Sections lILA, IV.B and V.C & D (describing the South Korea Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission process and impacts). 
2 See Tara Melish, Implementing Truth and Reconciliation: Comparative Lessons for 
the Republic of Korea, 19 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1,42 (2012). 
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In Peru, despite initial progress, those suffering from the government's 
prolonged fight with insurgents called loudly for follow through on truth 
commission recommendations.3 They demanded in 2013 badly-needed, 
long-delayed economic justice.4 
In South Africa, the widely praised post-apartheid reconciliation initiative 
faced charges of having "fallen tragically short."s The former chair of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission lamented in 2014 that by "choosing 
not to follow through on the commission's recommendations, [the] 
government not only compromised the commission's contribution to the 
process, but the very process itself.,,6 
And in the United States, after apologizing to Native Hawaiians for the 
illegal overthrow of the sovereign Hawaiian nation and committing to 
reconciliation, shifting American political leadership and conservative 
justices halted steps in 2015 toward indigen()us self-governance. 7 "For too 
long," implored a Native Hawaiian leader, "[we] have waited for the United 
States ... to make right the wrong ... only to see the small.steps taken for 
J Se~ infra Section V.D (describing Peru Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
recommendations and impacts). 
4 See infra Section V.D (describing the need for eco~omic justice in Peru). 
5 See infra notes 6 and 238 and accompanying text. 
6 Desmond Tutu, Tutu: 'Unfinished Business' of the TRC's Healing, MAIL & 
GUARDIAN (Apr. 25, 2014), http://mg.co.zaJarticle!2014-04-24-unfinished-business-of-
the-trc-healing; see also injra Sections liLA and IV.B & C (describing the South Africa 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission process and impacts). 
7 See Chloe Fox, Supreme Court Blocks Native Hawaiians' Attempt to Form Own 
Government, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 2,2015), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/supreme-court-hawaii-
election_us _565f684ge4b079b2818d1767 (discussing how the Supreme Court of the 
United States granted an injunction, requested by a group of Native Hawaiians and non-
Hawaiians, challenging an election that Native Hawaiians hoped to use to form their own 
government and therefore "indefinitely stopped" Native Hawaiians from moving forward 
"until at least the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals issues its ruling on the election"). 
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our benefit persistently attacked ... Reconciliation has been an option thus 
far denied.,,8 
In recent years, governments and populaces embarked on major 
reconciliation initiatives to heal the persisting wounds of historic injustices. 
With an emphasis on personal and societal benefits of victim storytelling, 
perpetrator apologies, compensatory or symbolic payments, institutional 
reordering, and public education, reconciliation initiatives emerged on the 
political agendas of both established and transitioning democracies. 9 
Acknowledging and repairing the damage of grievous transgressions 
signaled government and populace commitments to human rights and 
reparative justice. 10 And it illuminated the high aspirations and moral tenor 
of civil societies. II 
Despite those aspirations and commitments and notwithstanding major 
reconciliation undertakings in South Korea, Peru, South Africa, the United 
States, and beyond, reconciliation initiatives stall. 12 Genuine social healing 
awaits. As eloquently recited by the National Survivors Network in its 2015 
petition to the Kenyan National Assembly, the "lack of a framework for 
implementing the recommendations of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation 
Commission" has "huge repercussions on the lives of hundreds of victims 
8 Statement by Trustee Haunani Apoliona, Chairperson, Board of Trustees, Office of 
Hawaiian Affairs; Testimony offered to the Committee on Senate Indian Affairs, 
February 25, 2003; see also infra note 39 and accompanying text (describing partial 
United States and Native Hawaiian reconciliation efforts). 
9 See, e.g., TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM'N OF CAN., 
http://www.trc.ca/websites/trcinstitutioniindex.php?p=3 (last visited July 15,2016); Hun 
Joon Kim, Truth Commissions in South Korea: Lessons Learned, MIDDLE EAST INST. 
(2013), http://www.mei.edulcontent/truth-commissions-south-korea-Iessons-Ieamed 
(describing South Korea's transitional justice measures since the democratic transition in 
1987); see also infra Sections II & IV.B . 
• 10 See infra Section ILA (referencing various global reconciliation initiatives). 
II See infra Section ILA (describing an "Age of Reconciliation"). 
12 See infra Section n.B (analyzing stalled global reconciliation initiatives). 
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who bear the scars of past serious human rights abuses.,,13 The systemic 
failure to follow through on the commission's reparative directives 
"under[cuts] victims' ability to obtain closure and restart their lives.,,14 
Why, then, despite substantial investments of time, energy, and money, 
are there often failures to follow through on truth commission reparative 
recommendations? And after considerable global truth commission 
experience, why are participants left without a workable framework for 
implementing crucial recommendations? 
More practically, in light of the persisting wounds of injustice, what 
needs to be done and by who to recalibrate and reinvigorate reconciliation 
stalled? In concept and in practice. Now and in the future. At bottom, how 
do we, as members of civil societies, bridge the chasm between aspiration 
and realization? 15 
These questions lie at the heart of our inquiry into the implementation of 
truth commissions' reconciliation recommendations. That specific inquiry is 
guided more broadly by social healing through justice-an analytical 
approach for shaping, evaluating, and reconfiguring reconciliation 
initiatives aimed at engendering healing for those still suffering deep 
wounds of injustice and for society itself. 16 This approach is grounded 
13 Kenyan Victims Demand National Assembly Adopt TRJC Report and Implement 
Recommendations, INT'LCTR. TRANSITIONALJ. (Dec. 4, 2015), 
http://www.ictj.orglnewslkenyan-victims-demand-national-assembly-adopt-tjrc-report-
and-implement-recommendations. 
14 Id. (quoting Christopher Gitari, Head of the Kenya Office of the International Center 
for Transitional Justice, who commented on the impact of legislative inaction of 
reparations recommendations). 
15 See infra Section IlLB (describing the "enormous chasm"). 
16 Briefly stated, the social healing through justice framework aims (1) to provide an 
analytical structure grounded in common points among respected academic disciplines, 
(2) which draws insights from the successes and failures of actual redress initiatives, (3) 
and employs a common language that attempts to speak to the hearts and minds of 
communities in conflict, (4) while serving as a strategic guide for shaping, and then 
assessing, reparatory justice initiatives. See Eric K. Yamamoto and Sara Lee, Korean 
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theoretically-it draws from commonalities among several disciplines 
(particularly social psychology, political theory, economics, and human 
rights law).17 It is also pragmatic-it acknowledges practical redress 
experiences and the strategic significance of a convergence of interests and 
is attentive to words, actions, and realpolitik influences. IS And this approach 
to social healing engages individuals, communities, justice organizations, 
businesses, and governments in a dynamic process of recognition, 
responsibility, reconstruction, and reparation l9-the "Four Rs"-with the 
larger aim of fostering the kind of reparative justiCe that heals.20 
"Comfort Women" Redress 2012 Through the Lens of u.s. Civil and Human Rights 
Reparatory Justice Experiences, 11 KOREAN LJ. 123, 138-39 (2012). 
17 See id. . 
18 See id. 
19 Commonalities among diverse disciplines (social psychology, theology, economics, 
law-including international human rights-political theory, and indigenous healing) 
highlight four aspects of the kind of justice that fosters social healing: recognition. 
responsibility. reconstruction. and reparation. See id. These four points of inquiry assist 
groups and governments first in shaping a particular redress initiative and then in 
assessing whether the effort is on the path toward genuine social healing. See id. For 
elaboration upon the 4Rs (summarized below) in operation, see id. See also Eric K. 
Yamamoto & Ashley Kaiao Obrey, Reframing Redress: A "Social Healing Through 
Justice" Approach to United States-Native Hawaiian and Japan Ainu Reconciliation 
Initiatives, 16 ASIAN AM. L.J. 5, 33 (2009) [hereinafter Yamamoto & Obrey, Reframing 
Redress]. See generally ALFRED BROPHY, REPARATIONS PRO AND CON (2006); Carlton 
Waterhouse, The Good. the Bad. and the Ugly: Moral Agency and the Role of Victims in 
Reparations Programs. 31 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 257, 267 (2009). 
Recognition "addresses the psychological" by examining the historical, cultural, and 
structural context for past and continuing. suffering. See ERIC YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL 
JUSTICE: CONFLICT & RECONCILIATION IN POST-CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA 175-85 (2000) 
[hereinafter YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE]. By investigating the ways in which 
individuals "continue to suffer pain, fear, shame and anger," by decoding "cultural 
stereotypes that seemingly legitimize" injustice, and by scrutinizing "the ways that 
organizational structures" contribute to the injustice, participants can arrive at a 
recognition of the harm that paves the way for future healing. Id. 
Responsibility includes both "assessment of power over others" and "acceptance of 
responsibility of repairing the damage ... imposed on others through power abuses." Id. 
at 185. By focusing not only on the assessment of responsibility, but also on acceptance 
of the responsibility to act, the mutual engagement of participants that leads to successful 
healing is ensured. Id. 
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According to David Tolbert, president of the International Center for 
Transitional Justice, 40 national truth commissions, along with reparations 
programs and prosecutions, have initiated paths toward social healing 
through justice.21 They "have given victims a voice and recognized their 
Reconstruction aims to build "new productive relationships." ld. at 161-62. Effectively 
building the kind of relationships needed for successful healing and a sense of justice 
restored might include "apologies and forgiveness," reframing the "history of 
interaction," and the "reallocation of political and economic power." ld. Reallocation of 
power, through change in a "state's social, legal or political institutions and policies," is 
an important part. of reconstruction as it can assure underlying abuses will not be 
repeated. See Yamamoto & Obrey, Reframing Redress, supra, at 34. 
Reparation draws from its root word "repair." See YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL 
JUSTICE, supra, at 35. While it may include restitution, monetary payments, and 
"medical, legal, or educational and financial support for individuals and communities in 
need," reparation encompasses more than money. ld. Reparation as repair, and 
reparations as specific reparative actions, also encompasses rehabilitation, "restoration of 
property, rebuilding of culture, economic development" and public education. ld. Public 
education particularly can serve to "commemorate, impart lessons learned, and ... 
generate a new justice narrative about a democracy's commitment to civil and human 
rights." ld. 
20 The framework, originally termed '~interracial justice," was initially developed in 
YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 19. See also DAVID HANSEN, NATIVE 
AMERICANS, THE MAINLINE CHURCH, AND THE QUEST FOR INTERRACIAL JUSTICE 
(2016) (interpreting and employing the 4Rs reconciliation framework to assess 
reconciliation efforts with Native Americans). 
21 David Tolbert, A Wrong Turnfor Human Rights, INT'L CTR. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 
(Sept. 4, 2014), https://www.ictj.org!news/wrong-turn-human-rights; see generally THE 
POLITICS OF RECONCILIATION IN MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES 58 (Will Kymlicka & 
Bashir Bashir eds., 2008) (addressing the salutary and regressive potential of 
reconciliation initiatives); Adrian Little, Disjunctured Narratives: Rethinking 
Reconciliation and Conflict Transformation, 33(I) INT'L POL. SCI. REV. 82, 86 (2011) 
(rethinking the idea of reconciliation as a key aspect of transitional justice); Yamamoto & 
Obrey, Reframing Redress, supra note 19, at 21 (describing social benefits and problems 
of incompleteness of reconciliation initiatives). 
The International Center for Transitional Justice is an international non-profit 
organization that "works to help societies in transition address legacies of massive human 
rights violations and build civic trust in state institutions as protectors of human rights." 
About Us, INT'L CTR. TRANSITIONAL JUST., https;//www.ictj.org!about(last visited July 
15,2016). The International Center assists institutions and civil society groups "in 
considering measures to provide truth, accountability, and redress for past abuses." ld. In 
particular, the International Center provides technical expertise and knowledge in the 
following ways: advising government institutions and policymakers at all levels with a 
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suffering, while signaling to culprits that their crimes will not be 
forgotten. ,,22 
Yet, as briefly recounted at the outset, reconciliation initiated does not 
signal social healing achieved. Reconciliation is a long-term, multi-faceted 
political, social, and economic process?3 It bears potential not only for 
significant legal and social benefits, but also for incompleteness and even 
regression?4 Recognizing injustice and accepting responsibility (words) do 
not themselves assure reconstruction and reparation (actions). Many now 
see even well-structured reconciliation initiatives as stalled works in 
progress.25 
Writing for the International Center for Transitional Justice, Eduardo 
Gonzalez aptly observes that a truth commission's findings and 
recommendations are a key piece, but only a piece, of the reconciliation 
process. Implementation requires a convergence of factors, particularly 
political will; it is illusory to assume that government and private actors will 
automatically follow through?6 Executive and legislative implementing 
focus on government responsibility for past human rights violations; working with 
victims' and women's groups, human rights activists, and civil society with ajustice 
agenda; and researching, analyzing, and reporting on transitional justice developments 
worldwide through publications, policy recommendations, working sessions, and 
international convenings. Jd. 
22 Tolbert, supra note 21; see generally MARTHA MIN OW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND 
FORGIVENESS (1998) (exploring various struggles globally to find meaningful responses 
to historic injustices that fall between stark vengeance and unilateral forgiveness). 
23 See infra Section IV.B (discussing the prevailing reconciliation template). 
24 See Eric K. Yamamoto, Miyoko Pettit & Sara Lee, Unfinished Business: A Joint South 
Korea and United States Jeju 4.3 Tragedy Task Force to Further Implement 
Recommendations and Foster Comprehensive and Enduring Social Healing through 
Justice, 15 ASIAN-PAC. L. &POL'y J. 1,38 (2014). 
25 See HUN-JOON KIM, THE MASSACRES AT MT. HALLA: SIXTY YEARS OF TRUTH 
SEEKING IN SOUTH KOREA, 11-13, 166-67 (2014) (discussing South Korea's 
reconciliation efforts). 
26 Eduardo Gonzalez et aI., Risks and Opportunities in a Truth Commission Process, in 
Challenging the Conventional: Can Truth Commissions Strengthen Peace Processes?, 
INT'LCTR. TRANSITIONALJUST. 1,15,22 (2014), https:llwww.ictj.orglchallenging-
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actions often proceed slowly. Political organizing raises public 
consciousness and applies pressure for implementation.27 Experience 
shows, however, that sporadic public scrutiny and political pressure are not 
enough after a commission makes recommendations to compel long-term 
follow-through. 28 
Reconciliation policymakers, scholars, and advocates now search for a 
cogent next-step framework for assessing and refashioning troubled 
reconciliation initiatives?9 That search is both conceptual and practical. 
Implementation (like creation and operation) functions in an intensely legal 
and political environment. 3o Participation by a range of stakeholders-
bolstered by local, national, and international scrutiny-is essential to 
effectiveness and accountability.31 
With realpolitik influences in mind, to facilitate recalibration and 
rejuvenation, we suggest remaking a key part of the prevailing 
reconciliation template rather than scrapping reconciliation initiatives 
conventional-truth-commissions-peace/docs/ICT J-Report -KAF -TruthCommPeace-
2014.pdf. 
27 See generally DONATELLA DELLA PORTA & MARIO DIANI, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: AN 
INTRODUCTION (2d ed. 2009) (focusing on political movements and their impact on 
society and politics); MEGAN MING FRANCIS, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE MAKING OF THE 
MODERN AMERICAN STATE (20 14) (examining the importance and consequences of the 
civil rights movement on the process of state building in American political and 
constitutional development); JOSEPH F. HEALEY & EILEEN O'BRIEN, RACE, ETHNICITY, 
GENDER, AND CLASS: THE SOCIOLOGY OF GROUP CONFLICT AND CHANGE (2014) 
(describing how the civil rights movement raised awareness about injustice against 
minorities and led to political changes for other minority groups). 
28 See infra Sections III, IV.C & V.A (describing unimplemented truth commission 
recommendations). Reasons may vary for lesser-sustained post-commission collective 
efforts for implementation-people have already been given a recognized voice through 
public hearings, causes have been investigated, some recommendations have been acted 
upon, and collective political energy is directed elsewhere. This subject warrants further 
inquiry. 
29 See generally id. at 2 (urging drafters and other stakeholders pay less attention to 
general standards and more "to realities on the ground"); see also infra Section V. 
30 See infra Section V. 
31 See infra Section V.B. 
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altogether without viable alternatives for social healing. This remaking 
entails a new, formalized fourth step in the truth and reconciliation process. 
This proposed fourth step-an Assessment, Implementation, and Oversight 
Task Force-is an independent yet politically attuned stakeholder-
comprised follow-up body to assess and update existing recommendations, 
to facilitate the implementation of outstanding recommendations, and to 
refashion and oversee future reconstructive and reparative actions to 
further comprehensive and enduring social healing.32 
The Assessment, Implementation, and Oversight Task Force would 
undertake (1) integrated convenings of survivor groups, government 
officials, businesses, policymakers, and justice advocates, with oversight 
from journalists and civil society organizations; (2) an assessment of 
original truth commission findings and recommendations, particularly an 
evaluation of fairness and completeness;33 (3) a grounded critique of 
government, business, and community implementation of truth commission 
recommendations to date, particularly those aimed at institutional 
restructuring, economic justice, and public education;34 and (4) the 
recalibration and oversight of paths toward further reparative justice in light 
of evolving social, political, and economic conditions. 
To lay the foundation, this article's Section II describes the global 
reconciliation setting by canvassing salutary and troubled initiatives. 
Section III addresses the implementation challenge in bridging the chasm 
32 See Yamamoto et aI., supra note 24, at 37-81 (acknowledging the need for a fourth 
step mechanism to further the reconciliation process and describing a potential Joint Task 
Force to further social healing efforts in South Korea). 
33 See Eric K. Yamamoto and Susan K. Serrano, Healing Racial Wounds? The Final 
Report of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, in WHEN SORRY ISN'T 
ENOUGH 492, 496 (Roy Brooks ed., 1999) (providing a positive, though not necessarily 
critical, evaluation of South Africa's TRC report). 
34 See Melish, supra note 2, at 29 (observing that comparative lessons from Cambodia, 
Peru, and South Africa focus on these aspects of implementation, including "community-
level reconciliation, economic reparation packages, and memorialization initiatives"). 
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between reconciliation aspiration and realization. Section IV starts with a 
glimpse of reconciliation theory. It then describes the three-step basic 
structure of the prevailing reconciliation template: truth revelation, criminal 
prosecutions or amnesty, and. executive or legislative action on 
reconstruction and reparation. The section concludes by painting a recurring 
picture of unfulfilled promises and identifies what is missing. 
Section V shapes these insights, along with principles of social healing 
through justice,35 into a more fully delineated new fourth step for better 
implementing truth commission social healing recommendations-an 
approach embodied pragmatically In the suggested Assessment, 
Implementation, and Oversight Task Force ("Task Force"). The section then 
describes comparative case study snapshots of two beneficial-though still 
limited-implementation efforts arising out of Peru's (no government 
participation) and South Korea's (too much government control) follow-up 
efforts. It concludes with observations about the potential and limitations of 
an integrated government-community-civil society task force. 
The aim of this article is not to fashion a cure-all for reconciliation ills. 
Rather its aim is to advance a crucial next step, in concept and practical 
structure, for channeling often fractious political and social interests further 
down a mutually beneficial path toward social healing through justice. 
II. THE SETTING: RECONCILIATION UPLIFTED, RECONCILIATION 
CRITICIZED 
A. An "Age of Reconciliation" 
Reconciliation initiatives proliferate. In the United States, a congressional 
truth commission investigated the mass incarceration of Japanese 
35 See infra Section IV.A for a discussion of the social healing through justice 
framework. 
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Americans during World War 11.36 The national government adopte~ the 
commission's recommendations and, in 1988, authorized a groundbreaking 
congressional and presidential apology, provided symbolic individual 
reparations, and funded public education projects.37 These words and 
actions aimed to heal the wounds of 100,000 mostly American citizens 
wrongly incarcerated because of their race and to repair the damage to 
America's ethos of equal justice under law. 38 Soon after, the US Congress 
and President formally apologized to Native Hawaiians for the 1893 illegal 
overthrow of the sovereign Hawaiian nation and promised, and later 
approved, initial actions'toward reconciliation.39 
36 See COMM'N ON WARTIME RELOCATiON AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, PERSONAL 
JUSTICE DENIED (1983) (official report of the Commission detailing the congressional 
investigation of the World War II internment of mainly Japanese Americans), 
https:llwww.archives.gov/researchljapanese-americans/justice-denied!. 
37 See generally ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, MARGARET CHON, CAROL IZUMI, JERRY KANG & 
FRANK WU, RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATION: LAW AND THE JAPANESE AMERICAN 
INTERNMENT (2d ed. 2013). 
38 See COMM'N ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, supra note 
36; YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 37. 
39 See Apology Resolution, Pub. L. No. 103-150 (1993). In November 1993, 100 years 
after the overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom, President William Clinton signed the 
Apology Resolution into law. See id. In addition, the Hawai'i Supreme Court and state 
legislature partially addressed the state's commitment to reconciliation with Native 
Hawaiians over self-governance and claims to homelands taken more than a hundred 
years ago in the illegal, US-aided overthrow of the Hawaiian nation. See Jesse 
Greenspan, Hawaii's Monarchy Overthrown with Us. Support, 120 Years Ago, HISTORY 
(Jan. 17,20 13), http://www.history.comlnewslhawaiis-monarchy-overthrown-with-u-s-
support-120-years-ago. The Hawai'i Supreme Court reinforced the state's legislative 
commitment to reconciliation by commanding that the governor stop selling formerly 
native-owned lands (now held in trust by the State ofHawai'i partially for the benefit of 
Native Hawaiians) until indigenous Hawaiian reparations claims to these lands resolved 
politically. Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Hous. & Cly. Dev. Corp., 177 P.3d 884, 902 
(Haw. 2008) (ruling on the basis of state law while incorporating aspects offederallaw). 
But see Hawai'i v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 129 S. Ct. 1436 (2009) (vacating state 
supreme court decision on federal law grounds and remanding to state court to detennine 
whether state law alone provided independent grounds for its ruling). In recent years, 
both federal and state governments have taken steps~met with support as well as 
vehement opposition-to act upon commitments to fully reconcile with Native Hawaiians 
either through recognition of Hawaiian independence or through some other form of 
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More recently, in the language of reconciliation, the US Senate 
apologized to African Americans for its failure to stem the early twentieth-
century epidemic of southern state lynchings, and the US House of 
Representatives apologized for the horrific harms of slavery and Jim Crow 
segregation.4o The House also apologized to Native Americans and Native 
Alaskans for taking lives and land and destroying native culture.41 These 
federal apologies followed path-breaking apologies for slavery by the state 
legislatures of Florida, Maryland, North Carolina, Alabama, New Jersey, 
and Virginia.42 Virginia's lawmakers also expressed regret for devastating 
Native American life, land, and culture43-stTong words of remorse and an 
articulated desire for reconciliation.44 
Private institutions in the United States also employed the language of 
reconciliation. In 2015, University of Missouri's president resigned after 
government-to-government relationship. See Michael Grass, As Feds Hold Hearings, 
Native Hawaiians Press Sovereignty Claims, GOV'T EXEC. (Aug. 12,2014), 
http://www.govexec.comlstate-IocaIl20 14/08/hawai i-sovereignty-department -interior-
hearings/912471 (describing Native Hawaiian sovereignty movements and the recent 
hearings held about possible federal recognition of Native Hawaiians). 
40 H.R. Res. 194, II Oth Congo (2008); Congress Apologizes for Slavery, Jim Crow, NPR 
(July 30, 2008), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=93059465; see 
also SHERRIL YN IFILL, ON THE COURTHOUSE LAWN: CONFRONTING THE LEGACY OF 
LYNCHING IN THE TWENTy-FIRST CENTURY (2007) (describing Congress' failure to take 
any steps to halt the epidemic of African American lynching). 
41 See Sean McCollum, An American Apology, Long Overdue, TEACHING TOLERANCE 
(Jan. 6, 20 I 0), http://www.tolerance.orglblog/american-apology-Iong-overdue. 
42 See, e:g., Damien Cave & Christine Jordan Sexton, Florida Legislature Apologizesfor 
State's History of Slavery, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27,2008), 
http://www.nytimes.coml2008/03/27/us/27f1orida.html( covering the spate of apologies 
by states with a history of slavery); see also Robert Allen, Past Due: The African 
American Questfor Reparations, 28 THE BLACK SCHOLAR 2-17 (1998) (focusing on 
reparations as "a matter of social justice for African Americans"). 
43 See S.1. Res. 332, 2007 Sess. (Va. 2007). See also HANSEN, supra note 20 
(documenting mainline denomination American churches' apologies to Native Americans 
for participation in abusive boarding schools and for past support of the land-
dispossessing "doctrine of discovery"). 
44 See Yamamoto & Obrey, Reframing Redress, supra note 19, at 21. 
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failing to address student grievances about racism,45 and Georgetown 
University's president convened a Working Group on Slavery and 
Reconciliation to respond to the university's roots in the slave trade. 46 
Brown University undertook a year-long public educational dialogue about 
its 'slavery history47 with an eye toward racial healing.48 And business giants 
Wachovia, Aetna, and J.P. Morgan Chase apologized for their historical 
roles in the slave industry.49 
45 See Eliott C. McLaughlin, University of Missouri President and Chancellor Step 
Down Amid Race Row, CNN (Nov. 9, 2015), 
http://www.cnn.coml20 15/ II /09/us/M issouri-football-players-protest -president-
resigns/index.html (reporting on the resignation of the University of Missouri president 
and chancellor amid a campus controversy over race). 
46 Christina Cauterucci, Why Protesting Georgetown Students Want Their School to Pay 
a Novel Form of Reparations, THE SLATEST (Nov. 13,2015), 
http://www.slate.comlblogs/the _ slatestl20 1511 11 I 3/georgetown _students ---'protest_ a Jesid 
ence _ hall_named Jor _a_slave _sellingjesuit.html. 
47 See Letter from Ruth J. Simmons, President, Brown University, to Steering Committee 
on Slavery and Justice, Brown University (Apr. 30, 2003), http:// 
brown.edU/Research/Slavery_Justice/abouticharge.html; SlavelY, the BraWl! Family of 
Providence alld Brown Univen·ity, BROWN U. NEWS SERV., http:// 
www.brown.eduiAdministrationlNews_Bureau/lnfo/Slavery.html. 
48 See generally Pam Belluck, Panel Suggests Brown U. Atonefor Ties to Slavery, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 19, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.coml2006/10/19/educationlI9brown.html?fta=y (noting that the 
issue of reparations for slavery was controversial); BROPHY, supra note 19. 
49 Wachovia apologized "to all Americans, and especially to African Americans and 
people of African descent," but refused reparations. In 2002, Aetna acknowledged its role 
in insuring slave owners and apologized, but refused reparations because courts would 
not award them. J.P. Morgan also apologized for using more than ten thousand slaves as 
collateral for loans. See Danyl Fears, Seeking More than Apologies for Slavery, WASH. 
POST (June 20, 2005), http://www.wa~hingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/06/ 19/ AR200506I 900694_pf.html; see also J.P. Morgan 
Disc/oses Past Linkl' to SlavelY, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2005, at E2. Only J.P. Morgan 
committed to reparatory action. It set up a $5 million scholarship program for African 
American undergraduates from Louisiana. Ken Magill, From J.P. Morgan Chase, an 
Apology and $5 Million ill Slavery Reparations, THE SUN (Feb. I, 2005), 
http://www.nysun.comlbusiness/from-jp-morgan-chase-an-apology-and-5-millionl8580. 
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Globally, countries energetically embarked down formal reconciliation 
paths to repair the damage of historic injustice.5o Among established 
democracies, New Zealand's Waitangi Tribunal, with an eye on 
reconciliation, made favorable determinations on indigenous Maori land 
claims.51 And atter years of debate about reconciliation, Australia's new 
prime minister apologized to its stolen generations52-thousands of 
aboriginal children forcibly taken by the government en masse from their 
homes and homelands. 53 
In the teeth of class action lawsuits and mounting political agitation, the 
Canaqian government and churches embarked on a far more extensive 
program of reconciliation with Canada's stolen generations. 54 From the late 
50 See, e.g., TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM'N OF CANADA, supra note 9; Kim, supra 
note 9 (describing South Korea's transitional justice measures since the democratic 
transition in 1987). 
51 See generally Joe Williams, Truth. Recollciliation. and the Clash of Cultures ill the 
Waitangi Tribunal, AUSTL. & N.Z.L. & RIST. E-.I0URNAL 234 (2005). Many of those 
determinations, however, also awaited implementing Crown government action amid 
shifting political alignments. See id. (describing political process for government 
approval of Tribunal awards). 
52 See The Australian Plime Minister's website, http://www.pl1l.gov.au/node!5952 (last 
visited Jul. 16,2016) (text of Prime Minister's apology speech); Tim Johnston, Australia 
Says "Sorry" to Aborigines jor },,[istreatmenf, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2008), http:// 
www.llytimes.com/2008/02113/worldiasiaiI3aborigine.html. See also Chris Cunneen, 
Reparatiolls. Human Rights and the Challenge olCon(iwltillg a Recalcitrant 
GOV/?l'I1ment, ill THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES 2000-2003: INTO THE 21sT CENTURY: 
RECONSTRUCTION AND REPARATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 183 (2003); Pamela 
O'Connor, Reparatiollsfor Australia's RemMed Aboriginal Children: Dejilling the 
Wrong, ill THIRD WORL.D LEGAL STUDIES 2000-2003: INTO THE 21sT CENTURY: 
RECONSTRUCTION AND REPARATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 219 (2003). 
53 See AUSTL. GOV'T, Sorry Day and the Stolen Generations, 
http://www.australia.gov.aulabout-australialaustralian-story/sorry-day-stolen-generations 
(last updated May 20, 2015) (referencing the Ruman Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission's Bringing Them Home report about the forcible separation of indigenous 
children from their families and communities during the European occupation of 
Australia). 
54 Twelve thousand individual claimants brought lawsuits, including two class actions, 
against the Canadiltn government and religious organizations. See $28 Package Unveiled 
for Residential School Survivors, CBC.CA (Nov. 23,2(05), http:// 
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1800s, in the name of educational assimilation, Canada's government 
forcibly removed aboriginal children from families and placed them in 
native residential schools that banned their mother tongue and inflicted 
rampant physical and sexual abuse. 55 In 2015, the Canadian government 
formalized its reconciliation commitment.56 Its initiative encompassed 
apologies, monetary payments, and creation of a healing foundation. 57 And, 
after the official publication of the Truth and Reconciliation report, newly 
elected Prime Minister Justin Trudeau promised to seek a formal apology 
from the Catholic Church for its pivotal role in operating and benefitting 
from the grossly abusive schools. 58 
Across the Atlantic Ocean, in the language' of reconciliation, then-Prime 
Minister Tony Blair apologized for the British Empire's sponsorship of and 
profiting from slavery in its many colonies. 59 Later, Foreign Secretary 
www.tribemagazine.com/board/showthread.php?t=1 05565; see also Russell A. 
Miller, Collective Discursive Democracy as the Indigenous Right to Self Determination, 
31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 341, 380 (2006/2007) (discussing conflicting perspectives on 
indigenous peoples' right to self-determination in international law). The pressure from 
the Baxter class action resulted in the Canadian government negotiating an Agreement in 
Principle, allotting $1.9 billion to fund a four-part reparations program. See Baxter v. 
Canada (Attorney General), [2006] 83 O.R.3d 481 (Can.). 
55 See Jennifer J. Llewellyn, Dealing with the Legacy of Native Residential School Abuse 
in Canada: Litigation. ADR, and Restorative Justice, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 253, 255, 257 
(2002). 
56 See Julian Walker, The Indian Residential Schools Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, LIBR. OF PARLIAMENT (Feb. 11,2009), 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/contentllop/researchpublications/prb0848-e.pdf. 
57 See id. 
58 Susana Mas, Justin Trudeau Says He'll Engage Pope on Apology for Church's Role in 
Residential Schools, eBC NEWS (Dec. 16,2015), 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/aboriginal-residential-schools-trudeau-meeting-
1.3367026. Although not a formal apology, in 2009, Pope Benedict XVI "expressed his 
sorrow at the anguish caused by the deplorable conduct of some members of the church." 
Id. 
59 See Jonathan Petre, Blair's Deep Sorrow/or Slavery 'ls Not Enough,' DAILY 
TELEGRAPH (Nov. 28, 2006), http:// 
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/11/28/nslave28.xml; see also 
Esther Stanford, Reflections all a Global Reparations Conference, NEW NATION, Aug. 
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William Hague and British High Commissioner of Nairobi Christian Turner 
similarly expressed the government's "sincere regret" for human rights 
abuses in colonial Kenya. 6o These apologies to Kenya's indigenous Kikuyu, 
also known as Mau Mau, complemented a political settlement of a partially 
successful Mau Mau reparations suit before the British High Court in 
2013.61 In the settlement's wake, Caribbean nations demanded reparative 
actions through suits against Britain and other European colonizers (France, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden).62 In France, political leaders 
deployed the language of reconciliation following eruptions over 
14,2006, at 8 (describing a Pan-African movement for slavery reparations from Britain 
and other European countries). 
60 See Ian Cobain & Jessica Hatcher, UK to Expect More Colonial-Era Compensation 
Claims, THE GUARDIAN (June 6, 2(13), 
http://www.theguardian.comlpol itics120 13/jun/06/uk -more-colonial-era-compensation-
claims (detailing British high officials' statements of regret and acknowledgment of 
wrongs in colonial Kenya). 
61 See Miyoko Pettit, Who Is Worthy of Redress?: Recognizing Sexual Violence Injustice 
Against Women of Color as Uniquely Redress-Worthy-Illuminated by a Case Study on 
Kenya's Mau Mau Women and Their Unique Harms, 33 BERKELEY J. GENDER, L. & 
JUST. 268, 270-72, 288-91 (2015) (describing the monumental political settlement 
between the British government and Mau Mau survivors for atrocities committed during 
colonial rule in Kenya). Most recently, over 40,000 Mau Mau survivors filed another 
reparations lawsuit before British courts for similar claims of torture and ill treatment 
under British colonial rule in Kenya. See Ken Olende, 40,000 Kenyans Demand 
Compensation for British Atrocities in Mau Mau War, SOCIALIST WORKER (Nov. 4, 
2014), 
http://www.socialistworker.co.ukiartl39364/40,000+Kenyans+demand+compensation+fo 
r+British+atrocities+in+Mau+Mau+war; Cahal Milmo, Mau Mau Uprising: Kenyans Still 
Waiting jar Justice Join Class Action over Britain's Role in the Emergency, 
INDEPENDENT (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.independent.co.ukinews/world/africa/mau-
mau-uprising-kenyans-still-waiting-for-justice-join-class-action-over-britains-role-in-the-
emergency-9877808.html (detailing the testimonies of claimants, who will not be test 
cases, involving torture, extreme violence, and sexual assault). 
62 This spate of recent lawsuits demanding forward-looking reparations is pending. Some 
will be adjudicated in domestic courts; others will come before the International Court of 
Justice in The Hague, Netherlands. See Don D. Marshall, Capitalism. Slavery and 
Reparations Battle, STABROEK NEWS (Sept. 1,2014), 
http://www.stabroeknews.coml20 14/features/09/0 I /capi tal i sm-s la very-reparations-battle/. 
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discrimination against mainly African immigrants.63 And Spain's National 
Court opened the reconciliation door to victims of the Franco dictatorship.64 
Spotlighting South Africa's transition from apartheid, social healing 
initiatives also encompassed democracies emerging from despotic rule.65 
Those initiatives spanned South and Central America (Chile, Peru, 
Colombia, Guatemala, and Argentina), Africa (Morocco, Rwanda, Sierra 
Leone, Kenya), and Asia (Timor-Leste, Indonesia, Nepal, Cambodia, and 
South Korea).66 Most nations established investigative truth commissions as 
a breakthrough public step toward recognizing and redressing historic and 
63 See Julie Chi-Hye Suk, Equal By Comparison: Unsettling Assumptions of 
Antidiscrimination Law, 55 AM. J. COMPo L. 295,309 (2007) (describing race riots in 
France, the country's "strict adherence to race-blindness"); Jennifer Kolstee, Timefor 
Tough Love: How France's Lenient Illegal Immigration Policies Have Caused Economic 
Problems Abroad and Social Turmoil Within, 25 PA. ST. INT'L L. REV. 317, 329, 330-35 
(2006) (discussing the history of France's immigration policy and explaining how 
France's tension with its former Atiican colonies has caused "Frenc·h rescntment" and 
"racism and discrimination against African immigrants"). 
64 See Jim Yardley, Facing His Torturer as Spain Confronts Its Past, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/20 14/04/07 /worldleurope/facing-his-torturer-as-spain-
confronts-its-past.html? _FO (dcscribing criminal prosecution of regime enforcer "Billy 
the Kid"). Most recently, amid calls for a formal truth commission, a Spanish court 
ordered the first exhumation of a civil war victim from a mass unmarked grave. James 
Badcock, Spain Exhumes Civil War Victim as Calls Grow for Truth Commission, THE 
TELEGRAPH (Jan. 19,2016), 
http://www . telegraph.co. uk/news/worldnews/Europe/spain/ 121 06843/Spain-exhumes-
civil-war-victim-as-calls-grow-for-truth-commission.htrnl. 
65 This is also known as "transitional justice" and refers to the "set of judicial and non-
judicial measures that have been implemented by different countries in order to redress 
the legacies of massive human rights abuses," including criminal prosecutions, truth 
commissions, reparations programs, and institutional reforms. What Is Transitional 
Justice?, INT'L CTR. TRANSITIONAL JUST., http://www.ictj.org/about/transitional-justice 
(last visited July 15,2016). Transitional justice specifically focuses on "achieving justice 
in times of transition from conflict andlor state repression" through accountability and 
redress.Id. It "provides recognition of the rights of victims, promotes civic trust and 
strengthens the democratic rule oflaw.""Id. 
66 See Pettit, supra note 61, at 278-79 (describing a wide array of reconciliation 
initiatives globally). 
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continuing harms. 67 For instance, Kenya's Truth, Justice and Reconciliation 
Commission heard testimonies from thousands of victims (or family 
members) about murder, torture, sexual assault, and forced displacement, 
mainly surrounding the country's controversial 2007 presidential election.68 
The commission documented atrocities, assessed responsibility, and, in 
2013, recommended extensive reparations for survivors.69 
According to the International Center for Transitional Justice, 40 truth 
and reconciliation commissions have given victims a voice and recognized 
their suffering. 7o We are amid an "Age of Reconciliation.,,71 
67 International human rights observers see truth commissions as part of an "effective 
transitional justice policy and as instruments that can contribute to the rule of law and the 
rights of victims of gross human rights violations." Eduardo Gonzalez, Set to Fail? 
Assessing Tendencies in Truth Commissions Created After Violent Conflict, in 
Challenging the Conventional: Can Truth Commissions Strengthen Peace Processes?, 
INT'L CTR. TRANSITIONAL JUST. I, I (June 2014), https://ictj.org/sites/defaultifiles/ICTJ-
Report-KAF-TruthCommPeace-2014.pdf. According to reparations scholar Eduardo 
Gonzalez, "[t]ruth commissions have become common components of post-conflict 
policy, with parties involved in peace processes routinely including commissions in the 
agendas of their negotiations and final agreements." Jd. 
68 See THE FINAL REPORT OF THE TRUTH JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION 
OF KENY A (2013), available at http://digitiaicommons.law.seattieu.edu/tjrc. See also 
Makau Mutua, Republic of Kenya Report of the Task Force on the Establishment of a 
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, 10 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 15, 15-24, 
34-56 (2004) (detailing the Task Force's recommendation to establish the Truth, Justice 
and Reconciliation Commission and possible goals for the commission). 
69 See THE FINAL REPORT OF THE TRUTH JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION 
OF KENYA, supra note 68 (presenting the commission's work, findings, and 
recommendations). See also Kenyan Victims Demand, supra note 13 (discussing victims' 
calls for the implementation of recommendations set forth in the Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation Commission's report). 
70 Tolbert, supra note 21. 
71 See generally THE POLITICS OF RECONCILIATION IN MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES, 
supra note 21, at 58 (addressing the salutary and regressive potential of reconciliation 
initiatives); Little, supra note 21, at 86 (rethinking the idea of reconciliation as a key 
aspect of transitional justice); Yamamoto & Obrey, Reframing Redress, supra note 19, at 
21 (describing social benefits and problems of incompleteness of reconciliation 
initiatives); Roy L. Brooks, The Age of Apology, in WHEN SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH 3 (Roy 
L. Brooks ed., 1999) (describing an "Age of Apology"). 
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B. Reconciliation Stalled 
Yet, reconciliation initiated does not signal social healing achieved. 
Reconciliation is a long-term multi-faceted political, social, and economic 
process. It bears potential not only for significant benefits but also for 
incompleteness and regression.72 Some characterize as a "soft option" those 
initiatives granting amnesty to perpetrators as part of the reconciliation 
bargain. 73 Others observe many even well-structured reconciliation 
initiatives whither at the end stages. 74 For them, the "Age of Reconciliation" 
is experiencing a "mid-life crisis.,,75 What is clear is that reconciliation in 
concept has disparate meanings and that reconciliation in practice has a 
mottled record. 
Reconciliation can mean a highly organized formal process of truth 
telling and reparation76 or an apparently insincere smokescreen77 to hide 
72 See Yamamoto et aI., supra note 24, at 38. 
73 See Mahmood Mamdani, Amnesty o~ Impunity? A Preliminary Critique of the Report 
of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa (TRC), 32 DIACRITICS 33, 33 
(2002) (characterizing South Africa's TRC as the "fruit of a political compromise whose 
terms both made possible the Commission and set the limits within which it would 
work"); J. Duffy & D. Ross, Bargainingfor Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: A 
Game- Theoretic Analysis, 20 S. AFRICAN J. OF PHILOSOPHY 66, 66-89 (2001) (examining 
how policies creating truth and reconciliation commissions that "trade civil and criminal 
amnesty with applicants in exchange for information" is an "imperfect information game, 
. where the commission attempts to maximize information (truth) while the applicant seeks 
amnesty for the lowest possible price"). 
74 See KIM, supra note 25, at 11-13,166-67 (discussing South Korea's unfinished truth 
and reconciliation process). 
75 See Yamamoto & Obrey, Reframing Redress, supra note 19, at 24. 
76 See generally Brooks, supra note 71, at 10-11 (describing South Africa's structured, 
publicly transparent truth and reconciliation commission process); Penelope E. Andrews, 
Reparations for Apartheid's Victims: The Path to Reconciliation?, 53 DEPAUL L. REv. 
1155 (2004); L YN S. GRA YBIL, TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA: 
MIRACLE OR MODEL (2002); DESMOND TUTU, WITHOUT FORGIVENESS THERE IS No 
FUTURE 35 (1999). 
77 Nepal's controversial effort to legislatively establish a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission to address the decade-long violence between the former royal government 
and communist insurgents has been sharply criticized for, among other things, its failure 
to embrace international human rights standards. See Amnesty International, Nepal: 
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behind-the-scenes political maneuvering. 78 Indeed, aboriginal groups, angry 
about the government's refusal to consider reparations, sharply criticized 
Australia's apology to its stolen generations/9 and Canadian indigenous 
groups characterized as insincere Canada's comprehensive reconciliation 
initiative because of delayed implementation.80 
Similarly, reparations proponents rebuked Britain's words of apology for 
slavery because Britain failed to embrace reparative acts toward 
reconciliation. 81 The Crown government's long delay, likely for political 
reasons, in finally acknowledging awards undercut the New Zealand 
Waitangi Tribunal's aboriginal land claims process. 82 Native Hawaiians too 
Reconciliation Does Not Mean lmpunity-A Memorandum on the Tnlfh and 
Reconciliation Commission Bill (2007), 
http://www.amnesty.org/enllibrary/asset/ASA31 /006/2007 /enldom-
ASA310062007en.pdf. 
78 Thirty years after the Pol Pot "Killing Fields," Cambodia's reconciliation project, 
emerging out of the 1991 Paris Peace Agreement, appears to be mired in confusion and 
political maneuvering. See Vannath Chea, Reconciliation in Cambodia: Politics, Culture 
and Religion, in RECONCILIATION AITER VIOLENT CONFLICT 49-50 (David Bloomfield 
et al. eds., 2003), 
http://www.idea.int/publications/reconciliationluploadlreconciliation_chap03cs-
cambodia. pdf. 
79 See Johnston, supra note 52; THE AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER'S WEBSITE, supra 
note 52 (text ot'Prime Minister's apology speech). See generally Cunneen, supra note 
52, at 183; O'Connor, supra note 52, at 219. 
80 See TRUTH HEALING RECONCILIATION (2008), available at http://www.trc-
cvr. ca/pdfs/200808I 8eng. pdf. Some who suffered find the overall efforts less than 
sincere, orchestrated by government for its Qwn benefit, and lacking the kind of mutual 
engagement necessary for genuine healing. !d. Following Canada, the Tasmanian 
government committed to reconciliation, apologizing, and authorizing individual 
reparations payments to its stolen generation of aboriginal children. Barbara McMahon, 
Tasmania to Pay 'Stolen Generation' of Aborigines [2.2m in Reparations, THE 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 2008), 
http://www.guardian.co.uklworidl2008/janl23/australia.international. Yet, the social and 
economic impacts of its promises are uncertain. 
81 See Petre, supra note 59. See also Stanford, supra note 59, at 8 (describing a Pan" 
African movement for slavery reparations from Britain and other European countries). 
82 See generally Williams, supra note 51, at 234. 
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criticized the United States for failing to follow through on its reconciliation 
. 83 promIses. 
Developing Latin American countries also experienced halting steps 
toward reconciliation. For instance, despite Peru's initial efforts,84 victims 
of the government's fight with insurgents called for disciplined follow-
through on truth commission recommendations, emphasizing still badly 
needed economic programs.85 For many, the delayed minimal economic 
payments and the lack of real economic capacity-building signaled a 
potential failure of the overall initiative.86 
In Asia well-intentioned reconciliation initiatives inspired by the South 
Korea democracy movement foundered at the implementation stages.8? The 
absence of meaningful apologies and the lack of economic justice erected at 
least partial roadblocks to social healing. 88 
83 See Grass, supra note 39 (describing the tension between US government actions and 
Native Hawaiian sovereignty movements). 
84 See Lisa 1. Laplante, Truth with Consequences: Justice and Reparations if! Post-Truth 
Commission Peru, 29 HUM. RTS. Q. 228,241 (2007) (explaining that victims and 
survivors are highly disappointed by the government's failure to implement 
recommendations). 
85 See Pablo de Greiff, Justice and Reparations, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS 
451,470-71 (Pablo de Greiff ed., 2006); see also Lisa 1. Laplante, Negotiating 
Reparations Rights: The Participatory and Symbolic Quotients, 19 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. 
REv. 217 (2012). 
86 See Laplante, supra note 85, at 231 (pointing out that delays in implementing 
reparatory measures left victims in Peru disillusioned with the work of the truth 
commission). See also Mattia Cabitza, Slow Justice for Peru's 'Disappeared' 20 Years 
On, BBC NEWS (Nov. 14,2011), http://www.bbc.co.uklnews/world-latin-america-
15718695 (noting that some victims have been waiting for over thirty years to find out 
what happened to their disappeared loved ones). 
87 See generally Jae-Jung Suh, Truth and Reconciliation in South Korea, 42-4 CRITICAL 
ASIAN STUD. 503-24 (2010) (describing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of the 
Republic of South Korea (TRCK) and noting its success in "bringing back the voices of 
the silenced" but also pointing out the TRCK's challenges and limitations). 
88 See Hun Joon Kim, Trial and Error in Transitional Justice: Learningfrom South 
Korea's Truth Commissions, 19 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 125, 158 (2012); Kim Dong-
choon & Mark Seldon, South Korea's Embattled Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
ASIA-P AC. J. (20 10), http://www.japanfocus.orgl-Kim-Dong_choonl3313/article.html 
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Japan faced international opprobrium after backsliding on its earlier 
acknowledgments of imperialist and World War II atrocities89 cast in the 
language of desired reconciliation.90 In 2015, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's 
special historical review panel praised the country's postwar economic 
growth and commitment to pacification but also cited "lack of 
(printing an interview with Kim Dong-choon, the former Standing Commissioner of the 
TRCK, in which he describes the achievements and challenges of the TRCK). 
89 At the 2005 Asia-African Summit in Jakarta, which addressed multilateral efforts in 
solving connicts, then-Prime Minister Koizumi, in the general language ofreconciliation, 
acknowledged Japan's imperial transgressions: 
Japan, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage 
and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian 
nations. Japan squarely faces these facts of history in a spirit of humility and 
with a feeling of deep remorse and heartfelt apology always engraved in mind, 
Japan has resolutely maintained, consistently since the end of World War II, 
never turning into a military power but an economic power, its principle of 
resolving all matters by peaceful means, without recourse to the use of force. 
Japan once again states its resolve to contribute to the peace and prosperity of 
the world in the future as well, prizing the relationship of trust it enjoys with 
nations of the world. 
Excelptsfrom Japan PM's Apology, BBC NEWS (Apr. 22, 2005), http:// 
news.bbc.co.ukl2!hilasia-pacificl4471961.stm. See generally Jamie Sheu, Clash o.fAsia 's 
Titans: China and Japan's Struggle for "Reconciliation," May 1,2006 (unpublished 
seminar paper, University of Haw ai' i) (on file with author) (analyzing former Prime 
Minister Koizumi's rhetoric of reconciliation in addressing charges of human rights 
violations by China). 
90 See Japan 's Apologiesjor World WarlI, N. Y. TiMES (Aug. 14,2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactiveI2015/OS/13/worldiasiaijapan-ww2-shinzo-
abe.html?_r=O (noting that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe failed to offer an apology in a 
2015 speech, visited a shrine for Japan's war criminals in 2014, and did not express 
remorse as Japan's leaders traditionally did in a 2013 speech). In 2007, the US House of 
Representatives called upon Japan's leaders to apologize to World War 11 Korean 
military se; slaves and to offer them meaningful reparations. H.R. Res. 121, 11 Oth Congo 
(2007) (calling on government to revcrse policy against reparations for women fl)l"ced 
into sexual slavery for Japanese soldiers). Japan's indigenous Ainu also demanded 
redress for the longstanding but less well-known colonization of Ainu lands and 
suppression of Ainu culture. See Yamamoto & Obrey, Re[raming Redress, supra note 19, 
at 21. 
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reconciliation with China and South Korea" as a fount of escalating 
criticism by those countries.91 
Sometimes political instability disrupts implementation of even carefully 
organized initiatives. In 2005, the new East Timor government established a 
truth and reconciliation process to address the violence of 20 years of 
Indonesian military rule.92 One of its pathbreaking tenets was gender 
redress to heal East Timor women's wounds of sexual violence.93 The truth 
commission embarked on a remarkable program of psychological healing94 
and economic support as a foundation for rebuilding the nation.95 But 
political instability slowed, if not scuttled, the healing process.96 
As this snapshot of troubled reconciliation initiatives reveals, the 
reconciliation concept's elasticity and shifting political underpinnings 
provide little firm guidance to policymakers and justice advocates.97 They 
91 Report on Japan's History Meant to Ease Skepticism, HONOLULU STAR-ADVERTISER, 
Aug. 8, 2015, at A4. 
92 See generally Galuh Wand ita, Karen Campbell-Nelson & Manuela Leong Pereira, 
East Timor Declares Emergency: Reaching Out to Female Victims, in WHAT HAPPENED 
TO THE WOMEN?: GENDER AND REPARATIONS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 290 
(Ruth Rubio-Marin ed., 2006). 
93 One of the Commission's recommendations was that "at least 50% of resources in this 
program shall be earmarked for female beneficiaries." /d. at 308. 
94 The Commission proposed the following: 
[ A] reparations program with five guiding principles-feasibility, accessibility, 
empowerment, gender, and prioriti-zation [sic] based on need-with the aim to 
repair, as far as possible, the damage to their [victims'] lives caused by the 
violations, through the delivery of social services to vulnerable victims and 
symbolic and collective measures to acknowledge and honor victims of past 
violations. [d. . 
95 See id. at 290. 
96 See Tim Johnston, East Timor Declares Emergency After Attack on Leaders, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 12,2008), 
http://www.nytimes.coml2008/02/12/worldlasial12timor. html ?scp= 1 &sq= 
east%20timor%20emergency&st=cse. 
97 See, e.g., Kim & Seldon, supra note 88 (noting that the TRCK's current leadership is 
unwilling to hold the United States accountable for its "indiscriminate bombing" 
practices and other atrocities during the Korean War). 
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render stated commitments to reconciliation susceptible to political mischief 
as insincere cover for continuing hostilities or power grabs.98 And 
reconciliation politics, by demanding agreement and consensus, at times 
marginalizes or even silences discordant voices.99 Equally important, even 
solidly conceived and operated truth commissions stumble at the stages of 
implementation and follow through.loo Critics of varying aspects of 
transitional justice abound, at times offering sharp and insightful 
critiques,IOI although often without advancing realpolitik alternatives for 
social healing. 102 
98 See, e.g., id. (pointing out that the TRCK does not currently have the support of 
certain key government institutions, including the police, the military, and the National 
Intelligence Service). 
99 See Lawrie Balfour, Act and Fact: Slavery Reparations as a Democratic Politics of 
Reconciliation, in THE POLITICS OF RECONCILIATION IN MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES 96 
(Will Kymlicka & Bashir Bashir eds., 2008) (endorsing disagreements, discord, and 
differences in the reconciliation process "that cannot simply. be managed, forgotten, ... 
[and] that resist[] the kinds of seamless narratives of national belonging that have been so 
effective at silencing [minority] claims"); Adrian Little, The Complex Agon, in LAW AND 
AGONISTIC POLITICS 193, 198 (Andrew Schaap ed., 2009). 
100 See Alexander Keller Hirsch, Theorizing Post-Conflict Reconciliation, in THEORIZING 
POST CONFLICT RECONCILIATION: AGONISM, RESTITUTION AND REPAIR i (Alexander 
Keller Hirsch ed., 2012) (critiquing assumptions informing many reconciliation projects 
and underscoring the importance and difficulty of "restitution and repair"); Bashir Bashir, 
Accommodating Historically Oppressed Social Groups: Deliberative Democracy and the 
Politics of Reconciliation, in THE POLITICS OF RECONCILIATION IN MULTICULTURAL 
SOCIETIES 58 (Will Kymlicka & Bashir Bashir eds., 2008) ("[S]ymbolic compensation 
without accompanying efforts to repair damaged conditions is [also] likely to be labeled 
'insincere. '''). 
101 See generally THE POLITICS OF RECONCILIATION IN MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES, 
supra note 21, at 58; Hirsch, supra note I 00, at i. 
102 See Paul Muldoon, The Very Basis of Civility: On Agonism, Conquest, and 
Reconciliation, in THE POLITICS OF RECONCILIATION IN MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES, 
114 (Will Kymlicka & Bashir Bashir eds., 2008); Erik Doxtader, Reconciliation - A 
Rhetorical Conception, 89 Q.J. SPEECH 267 (2003); Mark Howard Ross, Ritual and the 
Politics of Reconciliation, in FROM CONFLICT RESOLUTION TO RECONCILIATION 210 
(Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov ed., 2004). 
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Reconciliation policymakers, scholars, and advocates thus search for a 
cogent framework for guiding, assessing, and refashioning troubled 
reconciliation initiatives. 
III. THE CHALLENGE: BRIDGING THE RECONCILIATION CHASM 
Despite important steps forward, a society'S failure to implement 
reconciliation recommendations, often for needed reconstruction and 
reparation, means that the pain, blame, guilt, and economic dislocation 
persist. 103 Reconciliation stalled generates real, on-the-ground consequences 
for people, communities, and societies. A momentous challenge, then, for 
both established and developing democracies is this: how to follow through 
on truth commission recommendations and recalibrate and rejuvenate 
halting reconciliation initiatives. 
A. Unfinished Business-Illustrations 
An illuminating example of the reconciliation's unfinished business is 
South Africa's TRC. Despite initial salutary efforts, South Africa's 
government stopped individual reparations payments and community 
economic capacity-building. 104 Additionally, South Africa's businesses 
reacted with notable indifference to the TRC recomIDendations that 
businesses profiting from the racial caste system contribute to repairing the 
damage. lOS No South African companies operating during apartheid 
103 See supra Section ILA & B. 
104 See Phillip De Wet, Reparations Still on the Back Foot, MAIL & GUARDIAN (Nov. 16, 
2012), http://mg.co.zaiarticle/20 12-11-16-00-reparations-still-on-the-back-foot 
(explaining why the President's Fund-which was "created with the sole purpose of 
making reparations for apartheid as part of the broader reconciliation drive"-has not 
fulfilled its purpose); see also Eric K. Yamamoto & Brian Mackintosh, Redress and the 
Salience of Economic Justice, FORUM ON PUBLIC POL'y II (2010), 
http://forurnonpublicpolicy.com/voI20 I 0.no4/archive. vol20 10.no4/yamamoto.pdf. 
105 Yamamoto & Mackintosh, supra note 104, at 12; see Xolani Mbanjwa, R525m Paid 
Out Since TRC Started, PRETORIA NEWS (July 16, 2008), 
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contributed to the reparations fund. l06 For Archbishop Tutu, this deliberate 
corporate absence tears at the heart of the reconciliation initiative-business 
payments "as a vehicle for those who had benefited from the past to 
contribute to the future was stillborn.,,107 
More broadly, South Africa's government and apartheid businesses fell 
far short of implementing the TRC's economic recommendations "to 
advance economic transformation and enhance the economic participation 
of black people in the South African economy.,,108 Observers characterized 
economic capacity-building programs as "poorly implemented" and 
"wrought with corruption, fraud and misrepresentation.,,109 For Archbishop 
Tutu, genuine reconstruction and reparation for those harmed by apartheid 
remain unfinished business. 110 
Similarly, in South Korea, some now view its TRCK recommended 
reconstructive and reparative work for historic atrocities as starkly 
incomplete. The South Korea government initially implemented several 
TRCK recommendations from a partial list. III But, as a media watchdog 
http://www.io1.co.za/index.php?set_id=l&click_id= 13&art_ id=vn20080716062642926C 
223345. 
106 See Mbanjwa, supra note 105. 
107 Tutu, supra note 6. 
108 See Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment, DEP'T OF TRADE & IND., REPUBLIC 
OF SOUTH AFRICA, https://www.thedti.gov.za/economic_empowermentibee.jsp (last 
visited Aug. 10,2016). 
109 Harry C. Alford, South Africa's Black Economic Empowerment Program Has Failed, 
NAT'L BLACK CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, http://www.nationalbcc.org/news/beyond-the-
rhetoric/ 122 8-south -africas-b lack -economi c-empowerment -program-has-fai I ed (last 
visited May 19, 2015). 
110 Tutu, supra note 6. 
III See generally Suh, supra note 87; Kim, supra note 9, at 158. South Korea leaders had 
launched myriad reconciliation initiatives following the country's transition to 
democracy. See Tae-Ung Baik, Fairness in Transitional Justice Initiatives: The Case of 
South Korea, 19 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 169, 170 (2012). Since 1996, over 18 formal 
truth and reconciliation commissions sought to repair the damage of historic injustice.ld. 
Most commissions focused on singular events, including the 1980 Gwangju massacre, the 
1951 Guchang massacre, and the pre-Korean War Jeju Aplil 3rd Grand Massacre. See 
Kim Dong-Choon, Korea's Truth and Reconciliation Commission: An Overview and 
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observed, this entailed minimal effort because the implemented 
recommendations reflected the "least expensive or least controversial 
measures." 112 And changes in political leadership at times frustrated the 
goals and functionality of the truth commission. 113 Whatever the specific 
reasons, the TReK's three key recommendations-individual payments, a 
permanent research and oversight foundation, and acknowledgement of and 
proper burial for mass murder victims-still await implementation. I 14 
Assessment, 19 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 97,98-99 (2012) (reviewing "a number of 
special laws between 1995 and 2000 to settle certain unresolved historical cases"). By 
contrast, the 2005 TReK provided a comprehensive approach to investigate human rights 
violations during the twentieth century, including atrocities during Japan's colonial rule, 
the Korean War, military authoritarian regimes, and the 1980s democracy movements. 
See id. at 97 (describing TReK investigation of "massacres, incidents of death, injury or 
disappearance, politically fabricated trials, and the killing of unarmed civilians and 
political prisoner before and during the Korean War"). The TReK investigated individual 
cases of human rights violations, at the request of victims and their families, and 
recommended reparative actions to the appropriate government branches and agencies. 
See id. Despite initial promising investigative findings and reparative recommendations, 
many victims, survivors and families now express frustration at the truncated array of 
TReK recommendations and inadequate implementation of even express reparations 
recommendations. See Kim, supra note 88, at 158. 
112 Yun Hyeong Kil & 0 Seong Kwon, Government Bodies Stall in Implementation of 
Truth and Reconciliation Recommendations, HANKYOREH (S. KOREA) (Apr. 15,2009); 
see Kim, supra note 88, at 158 (citing the newspaper's opinion on the implementation of 
TReK recommendations). Out of 179 apologies recommended, the government has 
issued only 52 as of2010. Kim, supra note 88, at 158. And most of those apologies were 
seen as inadequate. Id. According to Professor Hun Joon Kim, they were mere 
expressions of "regret" or "condolences" by local police chiefs and low-profile military 
commanders, rather than presidential or formal acceptances of responsibility for the 
historic injustices. See id. at 157 (noting that the one exception was President Roh Moo 
Hyun's apology to the victims of civilian massacres during the Korean War, including the 
Jeju 4.3 Tragedy). Regarding retrials, as of 20 10, out of 42 cases recommended for a 
retrial, only 18 victims were able to show they had been falsely convicted. Id. 
113 Melish, supra note 2, at 42. 
114 Kim, supra note 88, at 158-59 (noting that the "conservative wing of Korean society 
vehemently attacked the commission" for its plan to create a permanent research 
foundation). "Major conservative newspapers criticized [the TReK] for 'trying to extend 
[its] work under [a] new title' and impugned commissioners and staff as 'people who are 
trying to benefit from the research foundation with taxpayer money worth 800 billion 
won.'" Id. at 159. 
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Colombia's extensive reconciliation initiative, too, remains partially 
stuck in the implementation phase. Following tru,th commISSIon 
recommendations, in 2005, Colombia's legislature enacted the Justice and 
Peace Law to facilitate demobilization of paramilitary groups and to redress 
50 years of massacres, forced disappearances, executions, torture, sexual 
violence, kidnappings, and community displacements. I IS The legislature 
passed a follow-up 2011 Victims' Law and other measures to facilitate 
reparations for victims and to prevent repetition of human rights 
violations. 116 But its comprehensive 10-year reconciliation plan faced 
mounting criticism. I 17 The inadequately financed and implemented 
reparations program and the release of former paramilitary leaders after 
reduced prison sentences, exacerbated victims' impressions of 
reconciliation backsliding. I 18 Many worried about the government's 
capacity to ensure safety in pockets of continuing armed resistance. I 19 
115 See Maria Camila Moreno, Uncovering Colombia's System of Macro-criminality, 
INT'L CTR. TRANSITIONAL JUST (Aug. 12,2014), http://www.ictj.org/news/uncovering-
colombia-systems-macro-criminality; see also L. 975 D.O. (covering the legislation 
passed to address victims' reparations and demobilization). Of the paramilitary groups in 
. Colombia, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia or Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC) is the largest and oldest. See FARC, INSIGHTCRIME.ORG, 
http://www.insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-newsIfarc-profile (last visited 
Nov. 10,2014). The group is estimated to have 8,000 guerillas in its ranks.ld. In 2014, 
FARC conunenced peace talks with the Colombia government.ld. 
116 See Nicole Sununers, Colombia's Victims' Law: Transitional Justice in a Time of 
Violent Conflict? 25 HARV. HUM. RTS J. 221, 225; L. 1448 D.O. arts. 1,8. 
117 See Sununers, supra note 116, at 234 (explaining how an important aspect of the 
Victims Law, the "decentralization" of the institutions responsible for victims support, "is 
likely to become an extensive barrier to victims"). 
118 Moreno, supra note 115. Moreno describes the basic premise of the Justice and Peace 
Law as a balance between demobilization of armed groups and their offer to guarantee 
victims' rights. See id. The current critique of Colombia's reconciliation effort is the lack 
of balance. See id. Armed conflict continues, and many of the combatants who agreed to 
take part in the reconciliation process are reaping the benefits of a reduced prison 
sentence but have failed to contribute to the Victims' Reparation Fund.ld.; see also 
Nicolas Bedoya, Criminal Politicians Fail to Repair Colombia's Victims of Paramilitary 
Violence, COLOMBIA REPORTS (Oct. 1,2014), http://colombiareports.co/parapoliticians-
handing-money-colombias-victims-reparation-fundl (concluding that victimizers 
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Implementation of Kenya's truth commission's reparations 
recommendations stalled in the National Assembly. Because the "National 
Assembly's inaction has had huge repercussions on the lives of hundreds of 
victims who bear the scar of past serious human rights abuse," the National 
Victims Survivors Network petitioned the National Assembly in 2015 for 
implementing action. 120 The petition highlighted the "lack of a framework 
for implementing the recommendations of the Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation Commission" and recited how the failure of follow-up 
"undermined victim's ability to obtain closure and restart their lives.,,121 
B. The Chasm 
Victims and families anxiously await promised reparative action. Their 
deep disappointment with unfulfilled promises, particularly for economic 
justice, threatens entire initiatives. Initial optimism over commission 
investigations and victim story-telling morphs into bitterness about the 
process itself. 122 
currently owe $650 million to the Victims' Reparation Fund, but so far, only $1.5 million 
has been paid); Victoria McKenzie, FARC Victims Form Federation to Defend Interests 
During Peace Talks, COLOMBIA REPORTS, http://colombiareports.co/farc-victims-form-
national-federation! (last visited Aug. 10, 2016) (describing the recent formation of a 
national federation of Colombian victims developed to promote 33 fundamental demands 
and concerns related to the ongoing peace talks with F ARC); Hope for Colombia's Peace 
Process, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2015), http://nyti.msIlHptV98 (describing recent 
negotiations between the Colombian government and FARC and noting that "[a]fter five 
decades of war, the prospect of a negotiated deal, not surprisingly, has many critics 
particularly among those whose family members have been killed or maimed in the 
conflict ... Some worry that guerrilla leaders who have committed atrocities could 
escape punishment"). 
119 See Summers, supra note 116, at 233 (detailing the difficulties imposed by the 
continuing armed conflict and the issues related to the law's guarantee of "security of the 
returned victims and the prevention of re-victimization"). 
120 Kenyan Victims Demand, supra note 13. 
121 Id. 
122 See supra Part II.B. 
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Taken together, this disillusionment signals a deep chasm between 
extensive truth commission mandates to develop detailed recommendations, 
including individual assistance and major societal reforms, and the 
dismissal ·or only limited implementation of these recommendations by 
governments and businesses. '23 The reasons for this chasm vary from 
economic vagaries to leadership turnover to evolving geopolitical 
relationships. 124 Whatever the reasons, for some and perhaps many 
reconciliation initiatives the enormity of the chasm threatens prospects for 
genuine social healing. 
This clouded picture of the reparative justice process is coming sharply 
into view. According to Tolbert, president of the International Center for 
Transitional Justice, even with the global growth of truth and reconciliation 
initiatives, "the international community appears to be backsliding on its 
human-rights commitments. The world's powers lack any sense of urgency 
in addressing abuses, preferring the pursuit of narrower, short-term interests 
to investing in long-term peace and justice.,,125 Tolbert acknowledges that 
some countries are pursuing genuine redress as a cornerstone of 
democracy.'26 But the recalcitrance of others, "especially the emerging 
powers, threatens to end the world's all-too-briefera of accountability." 127 
Yet, countries and communities persist down the reconciliation path-
possibly because of still-envisioned societal benefits, or because of the 
absence of alternative comprehensive approaches to badly needed social 
healing. What, then, is needed to bridge the chasm separating aspiration and 
123 Neil Kritz, Policy Implications of Empirical Research on Transitional Justice, in 
ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: CHALLENGES FOR EMPIRICAL 
RESEARCH 13, 17 (Hug Van der Merwe et al. eds., 2009). 
124 See infra Section V (discussing limiting forces). See generally Kim & Seldon, supra 
note 88; Kim, supra note 88, at 158-59. 
125 Tolbert, supra note 21. 
126 Id. 
127 I d. 
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realization? What is needed to recalibrate and rejuvenate reconciliation in 
concept and in practice? 
South Africa's approach to reconciliation through its truth commission 
generated the template for later reconciliation initiatives. 128 It coalesced 
moral imperatives. 129 It structured initiatives. 13o And it deployed language 
and imagery that highlighted possible common ground for initial political 
action. 131 
Although giving public voice to numerous victims of apartheid violence. 
and initially garnering widespread praise, the South Africa reconciliation 
initiative failed to generate a pervasive sense of real social healing over 
time I 32_the chasm unbridged.133 The South Africa reconciliation process 
thus embodied reparative action that was both bright-uplifting and 
illuminating-and dark-quarrelous and possibly illusory. 134 
Policymakers and the public tend to focus on the salutary, to believe that 
once a truth commission's work is finished, .the country will be reconciled 
and the victims will naturally bestow forgiveness. 135 But truth commissions 
in operation are only a "part of a larger transitional justice process rather 
than integral, one-time solutions in themselves. ,,136 Closely related, criminal 
128 See Kritz, supra note 123, at 13-14. 
129 I d. 
130 !d. 
Ilild. 
Il2 See supra notes 104-110 and accompanying text. 
III Yamamoto & Mackintosh, supra note 104, at 9 (exploring reconciliation initiatives, 
and specifically the unfulfilled economic justice programs, of Peru and South Africa). 
134 See South Africa: Impunity, Political Interference Emerge Below Veneer of a 
Celebrated Reconciliation Process, INT'L CTR. TRANSITIONAL JUST. (Feb. 19,2016), 
http://www.ictj.org/multimedia/audio/south-africa-impunity-nokuthula-simelane-justice 
(describing one South African family's 33 year wrenching "pursuit of truth and 
accountability" for the abduction, torture, and disappearance of an anti-apartheid 
activist). 
Il5 Gonzalez et aI., supra note 26. . 
116Id. For Professor Hun Joon Kim, "[t]he work of any truth commission does not end 
with the mere completion of its mandate. Rather, that end is simply another beginning, as 
we have seen in many international and domestic examples." Kim, supra note 88, at 167. 
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prosecutions or amnesty along with piecemeal legislative or exec;utive 
actions, though important, do not and cannot fully repair the damage of 
injustice. 137 Those kinds of actions, like truth commissions inquiries, serve 
at best as a starting point for a much broader societal effort toward social 
healing. 138 
Reparative justice scholars and advocates thus are beginning to extend 
the theoretical framework for reconciliation to better account for practical 
on-the-ground post-commission realities. 139 Section V shapes this work into 
a more fully delineated, new fourth step follow-up in the reconciliation 
process-an Assessment, Implementation, and Oversight Task Force. As 
the foundation for that fourth step, Section IV describes and critiques the 
prevailing reconciliation template's three steps. 
IV. THE PREVAILING TEMPLATE 
Post-World War II Holocaust reparations by Germany and private 
businesses profiting from Jewish slave labor laid the early foundation for 
reconciliation initiatives. 14o In 1988, US redress for the internment of 
Japanese Americans offered a multi-faceted process for healing wounds of 
mass civil liberties violations and repairing damage to those incarcerated 
and American society itself-a congressional truth finding investigation, a 
presidential apology, individual reparations payments, and a public 
137 See, e.g., Timeline: Transitional Justice Mechanisms in Colombia Since 2005, [NT'L 
CTR. TRANSITIONAL JUST. (2013), http://ictj.orglcolombia-timelinelindex_eng.html 
(describing Colombia's sometimes piecemeal reconciliation process). 
138 See generally Kim, supra note III, at 97; Melish, supra note 2, at 1. 
139 See infra Section V; see generally Gonzalez et aI., supra note 26, at 2 (urging drafters 
and other stakeholders to pay more attention "to realities on the ground"). 
140 See generally Ariel Colonomos, German Reparations to the Jews after World War II: 
A Turning Point in the History of Reparations, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, 
(Pablo de Grieff ed., 2006) (explaining that the German-Israeli reparations program after 
World War II was "the largest, most comprehensive reparations program ever 
implemented"). 
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education fund. 141 These and other reconciliation experiences, particularly 
South Africa's, shape a prevailing reconciliation template. This section 
briefly articulates the template's theoretical foundation, describes and 
critiques its basic structure, and charts benefits and troubling limitations. 
A. Reconciliation Theory 
A selective description of reconciliation theory sheds light on the 
philosophical grounding for the prevailing template's integrated structural 
components. 142 The description surfaces discordant theoretical debates that 
at times mirror volatile reconciliation experiences on the ground. 
In theory, social healing embraces democratic notions of participation in 
the social, economic, and political life of a polity.'43 A breach in the polity 
by wrongly excluding some from the community is repaired by fostering 
reintegration and full participation. 144 In practice, repairing the breach-
or reconciling-means salving psychological and economic wounds by 
lifting barriers to liberty and equality in education, housing, medical care, 
employment, cultural preservation, and political governance. 145 
The South African concept of ubuntu reflects those social healing 
precepts.146 Ubuntu is the notion of interconnectedness-"people are people 
through other people"-and emphasizes healing through reconfiguring the 
141 See YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 311-75 (describing the 
multi-step process of redress and reparations). 
142 The descriptions here are truncated. They do not cover the field and are not attentive 
to nuance or variation. Nevertheless, they provide a basic understanding of the theoretical 
underpinnings of many on-the-ground reconciliation efforts. 
143 See YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 9-13 (describing the 
complex areas of social healing and reconciliation, especially as they relate to interracial 
justice). 
144 See id. 
145 See generally Daniel Bar-Tal & Gemma H. Bennink, The Nature of Reconciliation as 
an Outcome and as a Process, in FROM CONFLICT RESOLUTION TO RECONCILIATION 21 
(Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov ed., 2004). 
146 See Lynne Duke, Witness to a Celebration, WASH. POST, July 10, 1994, at W8 
(discussing the concept ofubuntu). 
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damaged pOlity.147 People suffering are not healed solely as individuals but 
through incorporation into a collective body. 148 Ubuntu "is far more restorative 
[than retributive]-not so much to punish as to redress or restore a balance ... 
[it is] restorative of the dignity of the people" as part of a common 
humanity.149 For this reason, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, former chair of South 
Africa's TRC, emphasized that his country could not be built anew without 
repairing the individual and communal damage of apartheid. I so Drawing upon 
theological and human rights precepts, reparative justice meant reintegration of 
the community, and reintegration meant "affirming the legitimacy of victims' 
claims [along with reparations to] bring back into the polity those who had 
concluded that this government has nothing to offer them."lsl Reintegration 
also meant bringing back those who atoned for heinous crimes-those who 
confessed, expressed contrition, and offered restitution. ls2 The aim was a 
functioning, new or restored community.153 
147 Jd. (noting that ubuntu is the "Xhosa phrase 'ubuntu ungamntu ngabanye abantu,' 
which means 'people are people through other people"'). 
148 See id. (explaining that "unlike rugged individualism, the centerpiece of Western 
culture, ubuntu values relations between humans: the spirit of sharing, of collectivism, of 
mutuality"). 
149 Tina Rosenberg, Recoveringfrom Apartheid, NEW YORKER, November 18, 1996, at 
90 (quoting Tutu); see also Mark Gevisser, Profile: Tutu's Test of Faith, AFRICA NEWS 
SERVICE, April 12, 1996 (quoting Tutu's description ofubuntu: "you must do what you 
can to maintain this great harmony, which is perpetually undermined by resentment, 
anger, desire for vengeance. That's why African jurisprudence is restorative rather than 
retributive"). 
150 Harold Wells, Theology of Reconciliation, in THE RECONCILIATION OF PEOPLES: 
CHALLENGE TO THE CHURCHES 30, 38 (Greg Baum & Harold Wells eds., 1997); 
Gevisser, supra note 149 (quoting Tutu's description ofubuntu). 
151 Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 
HARV. C.R.C.-L.L. REV. 323, 391 (1987). 
152 Guided by ubuntu and political pragmatism, South African President Nelson Mandela both 
exhorted and cautioned that the survival of many South African groups was dependent on, 
to an important extent, reconciliation with the others. See generally YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL 
JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 165-66. The transitional South African constitution, entitled 
"National Unity and Reconciliation," reflected this perspective. Jd. The interim constitution's 
post-amble envisioned healing among racial groups as a key to the peaceful coexistence of South 
Africans: "There is a need for understanding but not for vengeance, a need for reparation 
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1. Communitarian Ethos 
Ubuntu thus shaped South Africa's reparative efforts through notions of co-
responsibility, interdependence, and enjoyment of rights by all. 154 More 
broadly, those notions generally embrace communitarian theory that 
envisions citizens gathering to assess their condition and "cultivate 
solidarity and civic engagement".155 A communitarian approach through 
law and politics strives to build or rebuild communities, both physically and 
through a sense of connectedness and belonging. 156 Cast in this aspirational 
but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu but not victimization." Id. In light of apartheid-
inflicted social wounds, the post-amble stressed that "national unity, the well-being of all 
South Africans and peace required reconciliation between the people of South Africa." Id. 
Taking a cue from the post-amble, South Africa's judiciary embraced ubuntu and 
reconciliation as part of South African constitutional jurisprudence. Id. Linking social inclusion 
to healing, the South Africa Supreme Court highlighted South Africa's need in the rebuilding 
process to integrate into the polity those marginalized by apartheid. Id. 
153 See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
154 See generally YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 165-66. 
155 Michael Sandel, a leading exponent of communitarian theory, maintains that public 
spaces, where citizens can gather and interpret their condition to "cultivate solidarity and 
civic engagement," unify a community and create a stronger society. See MICHAEL 
SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT 349-50 (1996) (describing communitarian theory). 
Creating public spaces, like the TRC did in South Africa, allows parties to "weave the 
various strands of their identity to a coherent whole." !d. These narratives allow people to 
"make sense of their condition and interpret the common life they share" and to move 
forward collectively. Id.; see also AMITAI ETZONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY 254-55 
(1993). 
156 The communitarian framework for reconciliation identifies several characteristics of a 
complex society in conflict. 
(I) historical wrongs committed by one group, (2) which harmed, and continue 
to harm, both the material living conditions and psychological outlook of 
another group, (3) which, in turn, has damaged present-day relations between 
the groups, and (4) which ultimately has damaged the larger community, 
resulting in divisiveness, distrust, social disease-a breach in the polity. Within 
this framework, reparations by the polity and for the polity are justified on 
moral and political grounds-healing social wounds by bringing back into the 
community those wrongly excluded. 
Eric K. Yamamoto, Racial Reparations, 19 S.c. THIRD WORLD L.J. 477, 522 (1998-99); 
see also ETZONI, supra note 155, at 247 ("[Communitarianism is a] social movement 
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fashion, reconciliation initiatives aim to achieve social harmony in societies 
marred by painful past conflict. 157 Through "collective a~ts of public 
apology and forgiveness, reparation and restoration are imparted and the 
writhing conflict of the past is substituted for by the 'overlapping 
consensus' of community.,,158 
Generally stated, the communitarian ethos links to human rights norms of 
reparative justice.159 This ethos shapes reconciliation initiatives through 
aim[edJ at shoring up the moral, social, and political environment. Part change of heart, 
part renewal of social bonds, part reform of public life."); Bar-Tal & Bennink, supra note 
145, at 33. 
157 See supra Section II (describing various global reconciliation initiatives). 
158 Alexander Keller Hirsch, Introduction: The Agony of Reconciliation, in THEORIZING 
POST CONFLICT RECONCILIATION: AGONISM, RESTITUTION AND REPAIR 1 (Alexander 
Keller Hirsch ed., 2012). Prophetic theology, in concert with communitarian political 
theory, also undergirds some reconciliation initiatives, South Africa's in particular. See 
generally Wells, supra note 150; DONALD W. SHRIVER, AN ETHIC FOR ENEMIES (1995); 
MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., STRENGTH OF LOVE (1963); CORNEL WEST, PROPHESY AND 
DELIVERANCE (1982); THE KAIROS COVENANT (Willis H. Logan ed., 1988); JAMES 
CONE, BLACK THEOLOGY AND BLACK POWER (1969). 
159 Reparative justice is deeply rooted in international human rights norms that not only 
seek to prevent gross violations but also to repair the damage already inflicted. The 1966 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights mandates that anyone whose human 
rights have been violated "shall have an effective remedy." International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A(XXI), at 52, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16, 
art. 2(3), U.N. Doc. Al6316 (Mar. 23, 1976). Effective remedies for human rights 
violations shape reparative justice through reparations that "involve restitution, 
rehabilitation, and measures of satisfaction, such as public apologies, public memorials, 
guarantees of non-repetition, and changes to relevant laws and practices." See Oscar 
Schachter, The Obligation to Implement the Covenant in Domestic Law, in 
INTERNA TlONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 
325 (Louise Henkin ed., 1981) (describing the range of potentially "effective remedies" 
for human rights violations); Ignacio Alvarez et aI., Conference: Reparations in the Inter-
American System: A Comparative Approach, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1375, 1386 (2007) 
(describing a wide range of non-monetary reparative measures). 
In 2005, the United Nations Human Rights Commission approved the "Basic 
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparations for Victims of Gross 
Violations of Human Rights Law and Serious Violations ofInternational Humanitarian 
Law." C.H.R. Res. 2005/35, U.N. Doc. E/CNA12005/L.101 Add.11 (Apr. 19,2005). The 
human rights "Basic Principles and Guidelines" specify forms of reparative justice, aimed 
at social healing, including restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, and guarantees of 
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engagement by all with some role in human rights transgressions in 
fashioning a more inclusive community.160 It also encourages joint 
construction of a new, unifying justice narrative-from multiple, often-
dissonant narratives-about the causes and consequences of the conflict. 161 
Finally, it uplifts the significance of conflicting groups' commitment to, 
peaceable and possibly productive future relations. 162 
2. A Critique of Reconciliation 's Communitarian Ethos 
A primary critique of reconciliation's communitarian underpinnings 
emerges from recent academic debates. That critique, agonism, finds that 
communitarian values tend to serve majoritarian interests by skewing 
characterization of the injustice and remedial needs in ways that most 
non-repetition. See Cunneen, supra note 52 (broadly addressing approaches to reparative 
justice emphasizing reconstruction and reparation). 
Restitution means restoring a victim to the original situation, such as return of 
property, while rehabilitation includes medical and psychological care as well 
as legal and social services. Satisfaction compromises several possible 
measures: from apologies, full and public disclosure of the truth, and victim 
commemoration, to judicial and administrative sanctions. Guarantees of non-
repetition are equally varied, including legal reform and human rights training 
programs. 
Thomas M. Antkowiak, A Dark Side: The Inter-American Court and Reparations for 
Indigenous Peoples, DUKE J. COMPo & INT'L L. 7, 9 (2014); see also Dinah Shelton, The 
United Nations Principles and Guidelines on Reparations: Context and Contents, in OUT 
OF ASHES: REPARATIONS FOR' VICTIMS OF GROSS AND SYSTEMATIC HUMAN RIGHTS 
VIOLATIONS II (K. De Feyter et al. eds., 2005). 
160 See generally Bar-Tal & Bennink, supra note 145, at 21. 
161 Id. 
162 See generally id.; COLLEEN MURPHY, A MORAL THEORY OF POLITICAL 
RECONCILIATION (2010) (analyzing the moral problems of political relationships already 
under the strain of civil conflict and repression and identifYing the types of repair and 
transformation needed); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward a Jurisprudence of Law, Peace, 
Justice, and a Tilt Toward Non- Violence and Empathetic Means of Human Problem 
SolVing, UNBOUND: HARV. J. LEGAL LEFT 79 (2012-2013); Nick Smith, Just Apologies: 
An Overview of the Philosophical Issues, 13 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 35 (2013); Rachel 
Lopez, The (Re) Collection of Memory After Mass Atrocity and the Dilemma for 
Transitional Justice, 47 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 799 (2015). 
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benefit those with the largest places at the reconCiliation table. '63 And the 
call for communitarian social harmony tends to obscure, or even erase, the 
conflict's still-contested history and consequences. 164 
Agonist theory posits the impossibility of genuine consensus in a 
complex society and views a reconciliation mandate of societal harmony as 
dangerously exclusionary.'65 An overriding goal of harmony drowns out 
dissenting voices and perpetuates repression of those of lesser power, not as 
part of the original transgression, but later in attempting to rectify it. '66 
When assertive minorities are labeled uncooperative and, therefore, 
detrimental to harmony, they are quickly dismissed, or even excluded, from 
reparative processes. 167 
Agonist theory thus seeks to reconceive reconciliation not along purely 
communitarian lines but as a deliberate accommodation of perpetual 
conflict in a multidimensional society. 168 The theory aims to enable groups 
163 See generally Hirsch, supra note 100, at 1-6; Muldoon, supra note 102. Other 
branches of political theory critique are rhetorical and narrative. See, e.g., Doxtader, 
supra note 102, at 268; Ross, supra note 102, at 210. 
164 See Hirsch, supra note 100, at 3; accord Bashir, supra note 100, at 48-49 ("[T]he task 
of accommodation is made even more difficult when there are not only diversities of 
values, languages, cultures, and identities, but also persistent and unresolved issues of 
historical injustice."). But see Philip Selznick, Communitarian Jurisprudence, in TO 
PROMOTE THE GENERAL WELFARE: A COMMUNITARIAN READER 3 (David E. Carney 
ed., 1999) ("A communitarian ethos calls for integration, but also demands protection of 
diversity and reconciliation of interests ... The most important expression of civility is 
the virtue we call justice. Justice speaks civilly to the inevitable diversity of passions and 
interest. Differences are adjudicated, not erased."); James A. Gardner, Federalism and 
the Problem of Political Subcommunities, in TO PROMOTE THE GENERAL WELFARE: A 
COMMUNITARIAN READER 295 (David E. Carney ed., 1999) ("Communitarianism ... 
sees the self as situated in ... the social conditions which it finds itself, yet capable 
through personal reflection and dialogic engagement with others of thinking critically, if 
not transcendentally, about its goals, its moral views, and ultimately its own identity."). 
165 Jonathan R. Cohen, Coping with Lasting Social Injustice, 13 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. 
RTS. & SOC. JUST. 259,268-69 (2007). 
166 See id. 
167 See id. at 268-69. 
168 See Little, supra note 99, at 198. 
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to exist peaceably in the same polity amid tensions and conflict, rather than 
to compel groups to try unsuccessfully to leave behind the painful past. 169 It 
endorses differences "that cannot simply be managed, forgotten, or 
transcended and a commitment to equality that resists the kinds of seamless 
narratives of national belonging that have been so effective at silencing 
[minority] claims." 170 At bottom, it promotes conflictual engagement m 
hopes of producing a new society born and sustained amid discord. 171 
B. Basic Structure 
In light of marked differences among initiatives, a singular, universally 
accepted reconciliation structure does not exist. l72 Nevertheless, a basic, 
generally recognized reconciliation structure emerges. That structure-the 
prevailing template-tracks South Africa's truth and reconciliation 
process.173 Its path-forging Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) 
anchored the negotiated peaceful transition from apartheid to democracy. 174 
Inspired by Nelson Mandela and chaired by Archbishop Tutu, South 
Africa's legislatively created TRC significantly advanced social healing by 
169 See Bashir Bashir & Will K ymlicka, Introduction: Struggles Jor Inclusion and 
Reconciliation in Modern Democracies, in THE POLITICS OF RECONCILIATION IN 
MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES 1-24 (Will KymJicka & Bashir Bashir eds., 2008). 
170 Balfour, supra note 99, at 96. See also Little, supra note 99, at 198. 
171 See Cohen, supra note 165, at 268-69. 
172 See generally Bashir & Kymlicka, supra note 169. 
173 See Yehudith Auerbach, The Role oj Forgiveness in Reconciliation, in FROM 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION TO RECONCILIATION 149 (Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov ed., 2004) 
(describing attempts to "redress past injustice and bring about peace within torn 
societies" and citing the "best known example of ... a truth commission is in South 
Africa initiated by Nelson Mandela with the blessing of Desmond Tutu"). 
174 See generally Yamamoto & Mackintosh, supra note 104. The National Party-
composed exclusively of white South Africans---only agreed to give up military power if 
there was a process that granted whites amnesty and allowed them to keep their property. 
See id. 
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acknowledging historic and persistent suffering and initiating reparative 
programs. 175 
Three overlapping committees opened paths toward social healing. 176 
One committee focused on truth telling by investigating the gross human 
rights violations and by hearing the stories of those harmed. 177 Another 
committee considered amnesty for those who confessed to political 
crimes. 178 A third recommended forms of economic justice. 179 Together 
they set the stage for the tripartite structure of reconciliation initiatives 
globally. ISO 
Significantly, South Africa's TRC signaled to the world that, in response 
to historic injustices, there "is a need for understanding, but not for 
175 See Kenneth Christie, South African Truth Commission Performs Vital Rule, STRAITS 
TIMES, Apr. 25, 1996, at 39. 
176 Alexandra Zavis, Panel Faces Truth, Fear, and Anger: Apartheid's Past Is 
Confronted, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Mar. 2,1996, at 23; Amo Mayer, South Africa 
Begins Digesting the Apartheid Era, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Dec. 3,1995. 
177 See John Battersby, South Africans Weigh Exposing Apartheid Crimes, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, May 18,1994, at I (describing how the TRC aims to foster healing 
through storytelling and amnesty). 
178 See id. (describing how the TRC aims to foster healing through storytelling and 
amnesty); Rosenberg, supra note 149, at 87. 
179 See John Yeld, Apartheid Profiteers 'Must Pay Reparation, ' AFRICA NEWS SERVICE, 
May 12, 1997; TRC to Host Forum on Economic Justice and Reconciliation, SOUTH 
AFRICAN PRESS Ass., Mar. 14, 1997. 
180 See Desmond Tutu, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, South Africa (TRC), 
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.comltopic/Truth-and-
Reconciliation-Commission-South-Africa (describing how' South Africa's TRC "attracted 
global attention, as it was the first commission to hold public hearings in which both 
victims and perpetrators were heard." Additionally, because South Africa's TRC took a 
different approach from the Nuremberg Trials, the TRC was "hailed as an innovative 
model for building peace and justice and for holding accountable those guilty of human 
rights violations." Jd. Since the South Africa TRC, "[m]any other countries dealing with 
postconflict issues have instituted similar methodologies for such commissions." Id. See 
also South Africa: Impunity, supra note 134 (describing South Africa's TRC as 
"something of a poster child for transitional justice"). Cf Luciana Bertoia, 'The Model Is 
Argentina, Not South Africa,' BUENOS AIRES HERALD (Oct. 19,2014), 
http://www.buenosairesherald.comlarticle/ 172513/' the-model- is-argentina-not-south-
africa' (positing that Argentina's TRC is the prevailing model, not South Africa's). 
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vengeance, a need for reparation, but not for retaliation.,,181 For the TRC, 
healing individuals, communities, and societi 82 entailed both truth-telling 
and material changes in social, economic, and political institutions. 183 
More broadly, the TRC focused on ways to repair the persisting damage 
to people (physical, psychological, and financial), communities (schools, 
businesses, housing, infrastructure, and healthcare), and society (divisions, 
guilt, shame, and lack of moral standing).184 Drawing from communitarian 
philosophy, many supporters of South Africa's TRC believed that its 
investigation and recommendations would lead to institutional changes and 
eventually to new communities marked by racial equality. 185 
In sum, the prevailing reconciliation template featured three practical 
steps: (1) the country creates a truth-seeking commission to address past or 
ongoing injustice l86-investigating atrocities and hearing victim stories-
and to make findings of responsibility and recommendations for reparative 
action; 187 (2) the judiciary or a tribunal rules on either criminal prosecution 
or amnesty; 188 and (3) the executive and legislative branches undertake 
181 Robert Block, Apartheid Sinners Confront the Truth, THE INDEPENDENT (London), 
May 19, 1995, at 14; see Eric K. Yamamoto, Race Apologies, 1 IOWA J. GENDER RACE 
& JUST. 50 (1997) (quoting Justice Minister Dullah Omar, an author of the Reconciliation 
Legislation). 
182 See supra Sections II & IV.A. 
183 See supra Sections II, III & IV.A. 
184 See supra Sections II & IVA. 
185 See generally Adrien K. Wing, Towards Democracy in a New South Africa, 16 MICH. 
J. INT'L L. 689 (1995) (describing the transition from apartheid to a constitutional 
democracy); Rosenberg, supra note 149, at 87. 
186 See INT'L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, RECONCILIATION 
AFTER VIOLENT CONFLICT: A HANDBOOK 122-40 (David Bloomfield et at. eds., 2003), 
http://www . un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/Reconciliation-After-Violent-Conflict -A-
Handbook-Full-English-PDF.pdf (explaining that "one of the most popular transitional 
mechanisms in recent years is ... the truth commission"). 
187 See id. at 125. 
188 See id. at 97-111 (noting that "reconciliation processes are ineffective as long as the 
vicious circle of impunity is not broken"); Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, Dialectics Between 
Stable Peace and Reconciliation, in FROM CONFLICT RESOLUTION TO RECONCILIATION 
65,74 (Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov ed., 2004) (observing that "new beliefs should refer to 
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reconstructive and reparative implementing actions I 89 based on the 
commission's recommendations. 190 
1. Truth Seeking 
The reconciliation template's first step, and the heart of a truth 
commission's hands-on work, is "to seek the truth about past abuses in 
order to recognize the dignity of victims, uphold human rights, and 
contribute to social change.,,'91 The commission's truth seeking serves 
multiple aims, and truth itself has several meanings: a forensic or factual 
truth, a personal or narrative truth, and a healing and restorative truth. 192 
The key to this first step is public testimony to commissioners and, 
through media, to local and global audiences. South Africa's truth-telling 
the conflict with more objective attitudes, and even with self-criticism that includes 
recognition of one's responsibility for the misdeeds throughout the conflict and 
acceptance that both sides are victims of the conflict"). 
189 See supra Section II (detailing the last two of the 4Rs in the social healing through 
justice framework). 
190 See INT'L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 186, at 
145-6l. The International Center for Transitional Justice acknowledges that an 
"idealized, legalistic model" would place these three steps (truth telling, 
prosecution/amnesty, and reconstructionireparation) "in parallel, because reparations, 
truth seeking, and criminal justice respond to specific victims' rights that are demanded 
immediately." Gonzalez et aI., supra note 26, at 90. The reality, however, reflects that 
accountability, and more broadly social healing, is a "long-term process in which each 
transitional justice measure will have stages of different intensity and where different 
institutions will establish sequences with one another, sometimes causally." See id. The 
prevailing model, then, accounts for this reality where truth telling is more of a first step 
followed by prosecutions/amnesty and reparation/reconstruction. 
191 Kofi Annan, Foreword to Challenging the Conventional: Can Truth Commissions 
Strengthen Peace Processes?, INT'L CENTER TRANSITIONAL JUST. 1, I (June 2014), 
https:l/ictj.org!sites/defaultlfiles/ICTJ-Report-KAF -TruthCommPeace-20 14.pdf; see also 
Nadim N. Rouhana, Reconciling History and Equal Citizenship in Israel: Democracy and 
the Politics of Historical Denial, in THE POLITICS OF RECONCILIATION IN 
MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES 75 (Will Kymlicka and Bashir Bashir, eds., 2008) 
(emphasizing the importance of truth revelation and rejection of historical denial). 
192 See TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT, TRUTH 
AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA VOL. I, at 110 (1998), 
http://www.justice.gov.zaitrc/report. 
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committee enabled victims to recount stories of horrific politically motivated 
violence, including imprisonment, torture, rape, and neighborhood 
destruction. 193 By creating a receptive forum and documenting and 
disseminating victim accounts, the TRC helped generate "a new global 
'truth' about the personal horrors of apartheid through cathartic victim 
storytelling.,,194 
South Korea's TRCK also encouraged truth telling, although through a 
more staid process in which victims submitted individual applications, 
investigators examined claims, and commissioners made' determinations 
about the "truth.,,195 The TRCK received 11,174 applications, confirmed the 
facts of 8,468 claims, and published seven interim reports and a 1,100 page 
final report. 196 The TRCK extended its investigation into causes, reviewing 
193 See Suzanne Daley, Apartheid Torturer Testifies, As Evil Shows Its Banal Face, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 9, 1997), http://www.nytimes.comlI997/11109/wor\dJapartheid-torturer-
testifies-as-evil-shows-its-banal-face.html?pagewanted=all (describing the stories told by 
both the victims and the perpetrators of the Apartheid atrocities); Yamamoto & 
Mackintosh, supra note 104, at 9. 
194 Yamamoto & Mackintosh, supra note 104, at 12; see also Yamamoto et aI., supra note 
24, at 47; Jasmine Wright, South Africa Frees Apartheid-Era Death Squad Leader 'Prime 
Evil,' PBS NEWSHOUR (Jan. 30,2015), http://www.pbs.orglnewshour/rundownlsouth-
africa-frees-notorious-apartheid-era-killer-prime-evill (describing how Eugene de Kock's 
pending release from prison serves as an interest in national reconciliation, despite his 
prosecution, conviction, and prison sentence for twenty years). 
195 Kim, supra note 88, at 125, 142-44, 163 (noting that the TReK announced "state 
responsibility" for 1,340 civil deaths from the Yeosu-Suncheon Revolt in 2010 and 
confirmed cases from the Korean War in 2009). According to Professor Kim, however, 
the TReK focused on factual or forensic truth, rather than "personal or narrative truth, 
social or 'dialogue' truth, and healing and restorative truth." ld. at 163. Because of this, it 
failed to construct a single overarching historical narrative. Id. For Kim, this is the 
fundamental reason why the TReK recommendations and implementation of those 
recommendations were insufficient. Id. See also TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH 
KOREA: BETWEEN THE PRESENT AND FUTURE OF THE KOREAN WARS (Jae-Jung Suh ed., 
2013) (describing the truth and reconciliation efforts in South Korea after the Korean 
War). 
196 See Kim, supra note 88, at 152 (detailing that out of the applications received, "290 
cases were related to the independence movement, 8,175 to civilian massacres, and 2,709 
to human rights abuses" by either South Korea or South Korea's enemies); see also Truth 
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confidential government files and conducting interviews with officials and 
witnesses to generate a forensic truth. 197 
Some perceive the truth-revealing component of a reconciliation 
initiative to be of paramount importance. '98 The International Center for 
Transitional Justice observes, "more and more commissions are being 
created with the expectation that their foremost task" is truth revelation. '99 
Others are more cautious, even critical. Human rights scholar Tara Melish 
cites unrealistic assumptions about the effect of victim testimonies. 20o She 
notes that some "presuppose a direct causal connection between truth-
telling and the broader goals of transitional justice, uncritically concluding 
that the public airing of truths about the past will in fact bring about 
institutional learning, official acknowledgement, and social healing, causing 
victims and perpetrators to come together In reconciliation and 
forgiveness.,,2ol Instead, Melish posits that broader civil society and 
institutional actors must actively and persistently pursue reconciliation 
beyond initial testimonies to engender real transformation. 202 From this 
vantage point, truth telling is a crucial first step, but only one step, toward 
genuine reconciliation. 
Commission: South Korea 2005, U.S. INST. OF PEACE (Apr. 18,2012), 
http://www.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-south-korea-2005. 
197 See Kim, slJpra note 88, at 152 (noting that the TRCK could "issue a warrant to call 
witnesses for an interview and investigation" but that a warrant lacked "strong 
enforcement mechanisms, with only a fine not exceeding 10 million won for 
noncompliance (8,800 USD)"). 
198 See INT'L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY & ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 186, at 
122-40 (noting that "historical accounting via truth-telling is one of the most important 
steps in the reconciliation process"). See also Bar-Tal & Bennink, supra note 145, at 208. 
199 Gonzalez et aI., supra note 26, at xii. 
200 Tara J. Melish, Truth Commissions Impact: A Participation-Based Implementation 
Agenda, 19 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 273,279-81 (2012). 
201 Id. As discussed later, Melish's assessment calling for more active civil society 
engagement as the answer to truth commission shortcomings is itself narrow and, in 
important ways, shortsighted. See infra notes 371-72 and accompanying text. 
202 Melish, supra note 200, at 279. 
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2. Criminal Prosecution or Amnesty 
The reconciliation template's second step seeks acknowledgement of 
malfeasance through either prosecution and punishment or amnesty in 
exchange for confessions of political crimes.203 After the Cold War, many 
governments and international organizations created new justice 
frameworks to deal with the consequences of violence.204 Colombia's 
national courts, for instance, developed new criminal law standards that 
were more stringent than international human rights norms.20S By contrast, 
the United Nations-backed international and hybrid criminal tribunals 
adjudicated, albeit slowly, accountability for atrocities in the Balkans, 
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Cambodia, Lebanon, and beyond.206 
20J Some truth and reconciliation processes, however, skip this step because the truth 
commissions lack legal authority from constricted mandates. See. e.g., Kim, supra note 
Ill, at 106 (discussing South Korea's TRCK structure). South Korea's TRCK, for 
instance, "had no authority to punish perpetrators, even when they were positively 
identified and their wrongdoing plainly established." See id. It also did not have authority 
"to offer immunity to alleged perpetrators in exchange for their testimony or confessions, 
as had been done in the case of South Africa's TRC." Id. 
204 Tolbert, supra note 21. 
205 See Annan, supra note 191, at xi. Colombia's "human rights defenders [therefore] 
make extensive use oflitigation." Id. The Colombia government also recently 
acknowledged that negotiations with opposition forces almost certainly contemplate "the 
prosecution of those most responsible for international crimes." Id. 
206 Most of these international courts, including the International Criminal Court, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon, and the Appeals Chambers oflnternational Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, are 
located in The Hague, Netherlands. See About the Court, INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icclPages/default.aspx (last visited Nov. 15,2016); 
About the ICTY, UNITED NATIONS INT'L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER 
YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/en/about(lastvisited Nov. 15,2016); The ICTR in 
Brief, UNITED NATIONS MECHANISM FOR INT'L CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, 
http://unictr.unmict.org/en/tribunal(lastvisitedNov. 15,2016); About the STL, SPECIAL 
TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON, https:l/www.stl-tsl.org/en/about-the-stl (last visited Nov. 15, 
2016). Other hybrid tribunals, including the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, are located within the countries 
where the atrocities occurred. See SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE: RESIDUAL 
SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, http://www.rscsl.org/index.html (last visited Nov. 
15,2016); About ECCC, EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA, 
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Special prosecutor investigations sometimes adequately address 
significant issues for a post-conflict society, including political violence, 
economic exploitation, and corruption.207 Negotiated peaceful transitions, 
however, sometimes require the political compromise of amnesty-an 
effective pardon for political crimes publically confessed.20s African 
National Congress' leaders finally agreed to amnesty as part of the future 
South Africa TRC process when they realized that amnesty was a key 
sticking point in the negotiated peaceful transition to democracy.209 The 
only other option envisioned by those leaders: ramped up violent 
confrontations with the White National Party controlling the military.2IO 
The South Africa TRC's amnesty committee administered the amnesty 
compromise by insisting on perpetrators' full, detailed political confessions 
on the public record.2I1 The amnesty committee created a highly structured 
public forum for truth knowing that might not have otherwise 
https:llwww.eccc.gov.kh/enJabout-eccc (last visited Nov. 15,2016). And the 
International Criminal Court, with jurisdiction over 122 member states, considers cases 
referred to it by the governments or the United Nations Security Council. See About the 
Court, INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, supra. 
207 Annan, supra note 191. 
20R See INT'L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY & ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 186, at 97-
Ill. 
209 See Yamamoto & Mackintosh, supra note 104, at 10. 
210 See id. 
211 Truth and Reconciliation Commission, SOUTH AFRICA HIST. ONLINE, 
http://www.sahistory.org.zaltopicltruth-and-reconciliation-commission-trc (last visited 
Feb. 11,2015). The amnesty committee "was empowered to grant amnesty to those 
charged with atrocities during Apartheid as long as two conditions were met: The crimes 
were politically motivated and the entire and whole truth was told by the person seeking 
amnesty." [d.; see Truth Seeking: Elements of Creating an Effective Truth Commission, 
INT'LCTR. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 12 (Eduardo Gonzalez & Howard Varney eds., 2013), 
http://ictj.org!sites/default/files/ICTJ-Book -Truth-Seeking-2013-English. pdf (noting that 
South Africa's TRC "allowed victims to participate in amnesty proceedings where 
perpetrators confessed their crimes" and "encouraged several instances of direct contact 
between victims' groups and offenders in an attempt to foster dialogue and 
understanding"). 
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materialized.212 And it compelled wrongdoers to assume ·an important 
degree of moral responsibilit/ 13-but at the expense of criminal law 
accountability.214 
For this latter reason, some point to amnesty as an anathema to victim 
healing,215 saying it neglects victims' need for criminaljustice.216 Moreover, 
they warn that amnesty proponents mistakenly "try to legitimize [amnesty] 
by pointing to the [South Africa TRC] experience . . . as a so-called 
'tradeoff of fights'" but with a "warped and partial understanding of the 
complex mechanism used in that context and its consequences.,,217 
Others cast a skeptical eye on criminal prosecutions. The International 
Center for Transitional Justice, for instance, challenges those who assume 
that criminal prosecutions could happen regularly, let alone generate just 
outcomes. International Center President Tolbert observes that international 
criminal courts are "losing their momentum,,218 and that national criminal 
courts struggle to "address adequately troubled pasts without the support of 
international institutions," rendering the fight for human rights 
systematically through criminal law "virtually impossible.,,219 
212 Truth Seeking, supra note 211, at 12. 
213 See supra Sections II & IV.A (detailing the conceptual underpinnings of moral 
responsibility). 
214 See Gonzalez et aI., supra note 26, at 91. 
215 In the "absence of a firm commitment to human rights, powerful spoilers may pressure 
the parties to cheat victims oftheir rights by, for example, immunizing perpetrators 
through blanket amnesties or proposing a truth commission[] in order to impede criminal 
investigations." Id. 
216 See id. at xii. 
217 Id. 
218 David Tolbert highlighted the lack of international community support, mounting 
pressure, and slowing momentum stems partly from the reality that "[s]everal countries 
have attacked the ICC; [and] African Union members want heads of state to be immune 
from prosecution, thus undermining a fundamental principle of the court." Tolbert, supra 
note 21. 
219Id. 
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For some, a rigorous truth-confession requirement as a precondition to 
selectively conferred amnesty for political crimes reflects a path between 
ineffectual large-scale criminal prosecutions on the one hand and blanket 
amnesty on the othe~. South Africa's TRC walked that path.22o Another 
hybrid path, negotiated in Colombia in 2015 between the rebels and 
government, pursued prosecutions of higher-level leaders and orchestrators 
of crimes against humanity while bestowing amnesty to qualifying frontline 
fighters. 221 In these ways, criminal prosecution or selectively conferred 
amnesty, or some hybrid, is a second step in the reconciliation template. 
3. Reconstruction and Reparation (Including Economic Justice) 
The prevailing reconciliation template's third step is reconstruction and 
reparation. While recognition and responsibility mainly entail words and 
understandings, reconstruction (recasting institutions and formal 
relationships partly to prevent recurrence of transgressions) and reparation 
(repairing the damage to people and communities) require executive and 
legislative (and often business) actions. Combined with words and 
understandings, those reparative actions aim to generate inaterial changes in 
institutional structures and living conditions. 222 
Reconstructive and reparative actions might encompass presidential or 
legislative apologies and commemoration projects; changes in laws to 
require security force transparency and accountability in preventi~g abuse 
repetition; changes in institutional control over public resources that affect 
daily living conditions; broad-based public education and continuing human 
220 See generally Yamamoto, supra note 181. 
221 See A Big Leap Toward Peace in Colombia, ECONOMIST, Sept. 26,2015, at 37 
(describing three-year negotiated peace agreement between FARe and the government, 
emphasizing the hybrid amnesty-prosecution provision). 
222 See generally [NT'L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, supra 
note 186, at 145-48. 
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rights research; and individual payments, economic capacity-building, and 
community development.223 
As part of reconstruction and reparation efforts, South Africa's economic 
justice committee, aiming to empower black South Africans, generated a 
plan for immediate, long-term individual and community reparations to 
address apartheid's widespread economic damage.224 The plan responded to 
"the widening gap between the rich and poor to the 'historic benefit' 
enjoyed by apartheid businesses.,,225 Central to its plan were 
recommendations that private businesses, many of which profited greatly 
from apartheid, contribute to reparations funds and broader economic 
development. 226 
South Africa's government initially responded proactively-it delivered 
urgent interim reparations to those in dire need227 and partially improved the 
223 See id. 
224 Yamamoto & Mackintosh, supra note 104, at 9; see also INT'L INST. FOR 
DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 186, at 154. The plan consisted 
of five components: 
(a) urgent interim reparation payments for people in urgent need, to enable 
them to access services and facilities; (b) individual reparation grants for each 
victim of a gross human rights violation paid over a period of six years; (c) 
symbolic, legal and administrative reparation measures; (d) community 
rehabilitation programmes; and (e) institutional reforms. 
lNT'L IN ST. FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 186, at 154. 
225 Yamamoto & Mackintosh, supra note 104, at 10. 
226 I d. 
227 Simon Allison, President's Fund: Where Is the Money for Apartheid Victims Actually 
Going?, DAILY MAVERICK (Oct. 14,2014), 
http://www.dailymaverick.co.zalarticle/20 14-1 0-14-the-presidents-fund-where-is-the-
money-for-asheid-victims-actually-going/. 
More than 16,000 individuals-those who appeared before the TRC or were 
named in TRC reports-were given a one-off payment ofR30,000 each, 
beginning in 2003. Although this is far below the amount recommended by the 
TRC (which averaged out to R21,000 per person annually for six years) this 
money has at least been disbursed. According to the justice department, there 
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nation's infrastructure by building roads, water works, and schools in black 
communities.228 The government also enacted the Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE) legislation.229 This legislation and other post-
apartheid legislative economic measures sought to employ "direct 
intervention in the distribution of assets and opportunities" to lessen 
economic disparities.23o The BEE aimed for capacity building to "ensure 
broader and meaningful participation in the economy by black people to 
achieve sustainable development and prosperity.,,23I And, related, the 
Id. 
are only 20 people yet to receive their claims, and that's because the 
department can't find them. 
228 Yamamoto & Mackintosh, supra note 104, at 11; see also Christopher J. Colvin, 
Overview ~rthe Reparations Program in South Africa, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
REPARATIONS 176, 189 (Pablo de Greiff ed., 2006); Eddy Maloka, Chapter 4: The Fruits 
of Freedom, SOUTH AFRICAN HI ST. ONLINE, 
http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/chapter-4-fruits-freedom (last visited May 2, 2014) 
(describing South African measures post-apartheid to improve access to water, electricity, 
health care, education, and employment for black South Africans). 
229 BEE has been defined as: 
[A]n integrated and coherent socio-economic process. It is located within the' 
context of the country's national transformation programme, namely the RDP 
(Reconstruction and Development Programme). It is aimed at redressing the 
imbalances of the past by seeking to substantially and equitably transfer and 
confer the ownership, management and control of South Africa's financial and 
economic resources to the majority of the citizens. It seeks to ensure broader 
and meaningful participation in the economy by black people to achieve 
sustainable development and prosperity. 
See baron Acemoglu, Stephen Gelb & James A. Robinson, Black Economic 
Empowerment and Economic Performance in South Africa, at 4 (Aug. 2007) 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/publications/other/growthl06-
Procurement%20and%20BEE/02-
BLACK%20ECONOMIC%20EMPOWERMENT%20AND%20ECONOMIC%20PERF 
ORMANCE%20IN%20SO.pdf (citing 2001 BEE Commission Report, p. 2). 
230 BEE was designed to "[r]edress [] the imbalances of the past by seeking to 
substantially and equitably transfer and confer the ownership, management and control of 
South Africa's financial and economic resources to the majority of the citizens"-the 
previously disenfranchised black population. See id. 
231 See id. 
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executive branch established a President's Fund to emphasize the 
importance of monetary payments to apartheid victims. 232 
South Korea's TReK, too, made important-albeit limited-
recommendations for reconstructive and reparative actions. These 
recommendations included publicly apologizing, correcting government 
records, revising history textbooks and government publications, amending 
health laws, educating about human rights, supporting memorial projects, 
compensating selected individuals, and retrying those wrongly convicted.233 
Especially important for victims and their families, the TReK made three 
notable policy recommendations: (1) the enactment of a special law to 
provide individual reparations to victims of civilian massacres during the 
Korean War;234 (2) the establishment of a permanent research foundation to 
further investigations and reconciliation; and (3) the proper burial of 
victims' remains after unearthing mass murder sites.235 The national 
government's elective branches undertook initial implementing actions. 
C. Unfulfilled Promises 
In some situations, however, including the TReK's, external political 
influences limit the breadth and depth of truth commission 
232 See Allison, supra note 227 (referencing the establishment of the "President's Fund" 
in 2005). 
233 Kim, supra note 88, at 157 (explaining the recommendations were divided into four 
categories, including "(1) measures to restore the honor of victims; (2) measures to 
prevent the recurrence of human rights violations; (3) measures to achieve reconciliation 
and to promote democracy; and (4) measures to educate about and publicize the pas!."); 
see also TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, REpUBLIC OF KOREA, TRUTH AND 
RECONCILIATION: ACTIVlTlES OF THE PAST THREE YEARS 33 (2009) [hereinafter THREE 
YEAR REpORT]; REPUBLIC OF KOREA TRUTH AND RECONCILIA TION COMMISSION, 
REpUBLIC OF KOREA, COMPREHENSIVE REpORT, VOL. I , PT. I, 199-200 (2010) 
[hereinafter Final TRCK Report 2010]. 
234 The recommendations for reparations did not cover all atrocities, an example being 
Japan's occupation of South Korea. See Kim, supra note 88. 
235 Kim, supra note 88, at 157 (citing Final TRCK Report 2010); Final TRCK Report 
2010, supra note 233, at 211. 
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recommendations. 236 Moreover, as previously noted, even strong 
commission recommendations sometimes remain largely unimplemented by 
political branches and private businesses. 237 
Indeed, as South Africa approached 20 years post-apartheid in 2014, 
former TRC chair Archbishop Tutu characterized its reconciliation process 
as having "fallen tragically short."z38 Despite South Africa's salutary initial 
efforts, its entire reconciliation initiative teetered on the edge of failure. 239 
Tutu cited the lack of government follow-through on TRC 
recommendations as a major shortcoming?40 He lamented, "[b]y choosing 
not to follow through on the commission's recommendations, [the] 
government not only compromised the commission's contribution to the 
process, but the very process itself.,,241 Most important, the government's 
failure to implement TRC reparations recommendations forestalled the 
sense of reconciliation achieved.242 
Unfulfilled truth commission promises, particularly for economic justice, 
are key indicators of incomplete, stalled, or backsliding reconciliation 
initiatives. 243 In Colombia, for example, the government made many 
reparatory promises to the victims. 
236 See infra Section V.D.2 (discussing South Korea's TReK). 
237 See supra Sections ILB & III. 
238 Tutu, supra note 6. 
239 See id. 
240 See id. 
241 Id. 
242 See id. (describing how the TRC's accomplishments must be seen against "a backdrop 
of a hopelessly inequitable country in which most of the rich have hung on to their 
wealth, while the 'freedom dividend' for most of the poor has been to continue surviving 
on scraps"). 
243 See, e.g., Moreno, supra note 115. Importantly, this sense of "unfulfilled promises" 
often stems from the overall sense of a stagnant or regressing reconciliation initiative. 
Nevertheless, this sense may also come from "unrealistic expectations that are often set 
for truth commissions." Gonzalez et a!., supra note 26, at ix. "Raising expectations 
among victims that a truth commission will solve all of their urgent demands can create 
frustration and mistrust, compounding an already difficult situation. Similarly, any 
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The country told [victims] that each individual crime could and 
would be clarified through the justice and peace process, promised 
them that the reparations process would be rapid and effective, and 
also led society to believe that the criminal process would be able 
to clarify the deep-rooted causes of the paramilitary 
phenomenon.244 
But the promises remained pending indefinitely.245 Those suffering felt 
betrayed by government recalcitrance.246 
For black South Africans, the combined lack of government follow-
through on reparation recommendations and the private sector's harsh 
refusal to contribute to reparations funds heightened their sense of 
betraya1.247 Those most damaged by apartheid continue to live in poverty :-
"'. 
while those profiting from the decades-long oppression flourish. 248 Racial f 
divisions remain in a newly insidious form-with whites and a sliver of 
suggestion that such a body could solve all of a country's ills only sets up the public for 
disappointment." ld. 
244 Moreno, supra note 115. 
245 Id. 
246 See INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, "To WALK FREELY WITH 
A WIDE HEART": A STUDY OF THE NEEDS AND ASPIRATIONS FOR REPARATIVE JUSTICE 
OF VICTIMS OF CONFLICT-RELATED ABUSES IN NEPAL (2014), 
http://www . iclj. org/sitesl defaultifiles/ICTJ -Report-N epal-Reparations-2014 .pdf (detailing 
Nepal's victims' continuing frustration with inadequate reparative action). 
247 See supra notes 223-32 and accompanying text. 
248 SA United, Despite Divisions: Report, SOUTH AFRICA.INFO (June 26, 2006), 
http://www.southafrica.info/aboutipeople/nation-making-260606.htm#.U2Q8ofldVqU 
(detailing a government report released in 2006, which "stresses that economic divisions 
within the country remain set along the racial fault-lines created by apartheid"); see also 
Yamamoto, supra note 181, at 205 ("The fight for reparations has also had the 
unfortunate consequence of sidelining the responsibility of other role players besides the 
government. The complicity of foreign corporations and governments in supporting the 
apartheid regime has only recently entered the discussion."); !d. at 199 ("Jubilee South 
Africa has pointed out that the multinational corporations that helped to finance the 
apartheid government in its final, most repressive years removed roughly R3 billion 
(US$375,000,000) a year between 1985 and 1993 from the country. Jubilee argues that if 
l.5 percent of those profits was returned each year for six years, financial reparations at 
the level of the original TRC recommendations could be paid."). 
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elite blacks prospering and the vast majority of blacks remaining 
impoverished.249 
South Africa President Jacob Zuma recognized that recommended 
legislation for black economic capacity building failed to narrow the racial 
divide-whites continue to earn nearly 10 times more than blacks, and 
blacks are unemployed at rates five times higher than whites.25o He also 
acknowledged, "instead of redistributing wealth and positions to the Black 
majority, [the legislation has] resulted mainly in a few [black] individuals 
benefitting a lot ... while the leadership of most big companies [remain] in 
white hands. The Black masses, the intended beneficiaries, have hardly 
gained.,,25I Furthermore, more than a decade after creation of the 
President's Fund, most of the funds have yet to be dispersed, and a group 
representing apartheid victims has observed that new spending plans will 
not necessarily benefit traumatized communities. 252 According to Tutu, 
249 See Lydia Pol green, In a Divided City, Many Blacks See Echoes of White Superiority, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/20l2/03/23/worldlafrica/in-cape-
town-many-black-south-africans-feel-unwelcome.html?pagewanted=all&_r=O 
(describing Cape Town as "the last bastion of white rule" where many blacks feel like 
second class citizens). 
250 Alford, supra note 109. 
251 Id. 
252 Allison, supra note 227. The justice department is now turning toward community 
reparations, specifically providing health care, mental health care, education and housing. 
Id. But critics point out shortcomings of the new TRC purportedly in line with previous 
TRC recommendations: 
[T]he limited scope of the proposal excludes the vast majority of affected 
communities; that victims of Apartheid, as envisaged by the TRC, were not 
consulted properly in the process of drafting the new regulations and will not 
benefit directly from them; and that the type of infrastructure-heavy projects 
envisaged are simply to make up for shortfall's in the government's own 
municipal infrastructure grants (in other words, the President's Fund should 
not be used to do things that the govemment should be doing anyways). 
Id. (citing the opinion of the Khulumani Support Group, which represents over 90,000 
victims of Apartheid). Allison also notes that the justice department, in its plan for 
community reparations risks, "fail[ed] to adhere to the spirit of the TRC's 
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"most of the rich have hung on to their wealth, while the 'freedom 
dividend' for most of the poor has been to continue surviving on scraps."m 
With lurching economic advances for a few, but not economic justice for 
all, some now feel that the new democratic South Africa government has 
forgotten its promises to the people. 
Being forgotten and overlooked is very painful. The government 
here has not followed through on its promise to look after the 
soldiers and activists who sacrificed their youth, their education 
and often their lives for the struggle. [The government and privat~ 
businesses] make promise after promise, but never deliver and I 
and my fellow forgotten soldiet:s are still left in poverty. 254 
Myriad obstacles plague "a[n apparently] hopelessly inequitable 
country.,,255 Indeed, many now view the entire reconciliation initiative as 
"falling well short of the goal of national unity through social healing.,,256 
For Archbishop Tutu, what is needed is something that might "offer South 
recommendations, and is in danger of abusing [the] mandate to manage the PresidenCs 
Fund." Id. 
253 Tutu, supra note 6. Tutu describes the current situation in South Africa as follows: 
Id. 
But, today, as we reflect on the commission's contribution to re-weaving the 
fabric of our society, we do so against a backdrop of appalling violence being 
perpetrated, especially against women and children across our country. We do 
so against a backdrop of a hopelessly inequitable country in which most of the 
rich have hung on to their wealth, while the "freedom dividend" for most of 
the poor has been to continue surviving on scraps. We do so against the 
backdrop of an education system that is failing to prepare our youth adequately 
to contribute to their own and our nation's development. We do so against the 
backdrop of the Marikana massacre and of the public protector's report into 
the obscene spending on our president's property in Nkandla. We do so against 
the backdrop of a dearth of magnanimity and accountability and ethical 
incorruptibility. 
254 Yamamoto & Mackintosh, supra note 104, at II (quoting a former African National 
Congress soldier). 
255 Tutu, supra note 6 (quoting Tutu's description of the current state of South Africa). 
256 Yamamoto & Mackintosh, supra note 104, at 12. 
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Africa society as a whole a systematic way of re-visiting [what is yet to be 
accomplished] and dealing with [repairing the damage] of the apartheid 
years and of entrenching a human rights culture. ,,257 
As developed earlier, these kinds of unfulfilled promises mark nearly all 
truth and reconciliation efforts throughout the world-from the United 
States to Canada, South Korea, Columbia, Peru, Kenya, and beyond. What 
is needed, we submit, is a conceptually sound and practically and politically 
grounded new implementation fourth step in the reconciliation process. 
V. THE PROPOSAL: A NEW FOURTH STEP FOR ASSESSMENT, 
IMPLEMENTATION, AND OVERSIGHT 
As mentioned, none of the prevailing reconciliation template's three steps 
directly addresses mechanisms for guiding and overseeing the 
implementation of truth commission recommendations. This missing piece 
is significant because at times politics and economics generate vastly 
inconsistent, incomplete, or even regressive implementing actions. The 
prevailing template also does not account for the reality that truth 
commission recommendations themselves sometimes are truncated, missing 
meaningful recommendations for needed economic justice and institutional 
restructuring. 
A. The Need for a Structured Follow-up 
1;he prevailing reconciliation template, then, provides structurally 
incomplete guidance for ongoing social healing controversies. Some, 
therefore, are beginning to urge the retooling of the theoretical 
reconciliation framework to better account for practical on-the-ground 
realities.258 
257 Yamamoto & Serrano, supra note 31, at 496. 
258 Gonzalez et aI., supra note 26, at 2. (questioning "is it possible that in spite of the 
caveats against the automatic application of best practices, drafters and other stakeholders 
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What is needed to help bridge the chasm between aspiration and 
realization is this:' a structured implementation fourth step in the expanded 
reconciliation template. Described more fully below, this envisioned fourth 
step would be an independent yet politically attuned follow-up body to 
assess and update existing recommendations, implement outstanding 
recommendations, and refashion and oversee future reconstructive and 
reparative actions to further comprehensive and enduring social healing.259 
This envisioned new fourth step is in its incipient stages of development. 
Scholars and human rights observers are starting to explore it in depth. In 
2014, Professor Eric K. Yamamoto and Miyoko Pettit laid a conceptual 
foundation for fourth step implementing and oversight bodies generally and 
supported a concrete proposal for these types of bodies to foster a path 
.forward in the partially stalled South Korea "Jeju Tragedy" reconciliation 
initiative. 260 
In 2011, the Buffalo Human Rights Law Review convened scholars to 
examine the need for reconciliation implementation mechanisms 
specifically for South Korea.26 ! Human rights scholar Tara Melish 
highlighted the global need for a "permanent-follow up and orchestration 
mechanism" to "oversee and independently report on follow-up initiatives, 
both by government and broader civil society groupS.,,262 In assessing 
significant shortcomings of South Korea's 2005 TReK, Professor Hun Joon 
Kim concluded that the reconciliation initiative considered but failed to 
fully operationalize mechanisms for implementing the commission's 
pay more attention to what appears to be international standards than to realities on the 
ground?"). 
259 See Yamamoto et aI., supra note 24, at 43-46. 
260 See id. at 43-80. 
261 See Melish, supra note 2, at 1 (introducing the law review's symposium on tne 
implementation of truth and reconciliation commission findings and recommendations 
for South Korea). 
262 Id. at 65-66. 
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recommendations. 263 For Kim, a permanent research foundation would have 
been a needed next step.264 Melish characterized this research foundation as 
"a permanent follow-up body to the TRCK to take forward its work and to 
focus on implementation of its recommendations.,,265 The TRCK's 
Framework Act contemplated a similar body that never became fully 
operational. 266 
Kim's permanent research foundation and Melish's "permanent follow-
up and orchestration mechanism,,267 were generally cast more as ideas than 
conceptually developed proposals. 268 They did, nevertheless, signal an 
incipient call for a fourth step mechanism, highlighting the need for 
something more than truth commission recommendations and initial 
government responses. 
Others, too, perceive the limitations of the prevailing reconciliation 
model and call for something more. The lCTJ acknowledged that "truth 
commissions can contribute toward the implementation of victims' rights, 
but the full implementation . . . is beyond the reach of most truth 
commissions.,,269 Other follow up means are needed for governments and 
TRC participants to respond to unfulfilled promises.27o 
These broad suggestions, along with the principles underlying social 
healing through justice, inform the suggested new structured fourth step in 
the reconciliation process, first in concept and then in operation. None of 
this would come easily in practice. A follow-through fourth step in the 
reconciliation process would be fraught with challenge. What is suggested 
263 Kim, supra note 88, at 162-63. 
264 !d. 
265 Melish, supra note 2, at 22. 
266 I d. at 22. 
267 Id. at 65. 
268 I d. 
269 Gonzalez et aI., supra note 26, at 91. 
270 Moreno, supra note 115. 
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here is not a polished model for post-commission implementation but rather 
an initially grounded salvo to accelerate its development. 
B. A New Fourth Step in Concept 
Drawn from the work of justice practitioners and scholars, the needed 
fourth step is an independent Assessment, Implementation, and Oversight 
Task Force with four main functions: (1) convening stakeholders in a 
collaborative ongoing follow-up process; (2) assessing truth commission 
report findings and recommendations and updating existing 
recommendations; (3) shepherding implementation of original or newly 
updated recommendations; and (4) extending or refashioning and then 
overseeing next reparative steps in light of evolving political, social, and 
economic conditions. 
This follow-up body would be best "taken into explicit account at the 
[initiative's] design stage.,,271 It could also be fashioned after a truth 
commission completes its work, while the legislative and executive 
branches undertake implementing actions. In concept, the body would 
operate with a significant degree of independence. Inevitable realpolitik 
influences, however, mean that the extent of the body's actual independence 
would likely tum on its originating structure (composition and balance of 
decision-making power), its transparency (observer scrutiny), and the 
convergence of interests (among stakeholders) in the social healing 
enterprise. 
l. An Assessment, Implementation, and Oversight Body 
With this in mind, a fourth step follow-up Assessment, Implementation, 
and Oversight Task Force would entail mutual engagement by all major 
actors-government and private organization representatives, victim 
survivors and families, local community representatives, businesses, and 
271 See Melish, supra note 2, at 19. 
SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
Bridging the Chasm... 169 
researchers. Journalists, scholars, and civil rights and human rights 
organizations might productively participate as observers and 
commentators. The Task Force would "include spaces for broad stakeholder 
participation, ensuring that multiple spaces of leverage and information 
collection are available to local actors involved in implementation and 
follow-up work.,,272 More broadly, the Task Force would address the critical 
importance of active government and civil society engagement and 
entrepreneurship in following up on unimplemented recommendations. 
These follow-ups would include collecting and disseminating data and 
generating and employing assessment indicators for perpetual monitoring, 
all with an eye toward bolstering accountability.273 
In light of these considerations, executive or legislative action would 
legitimize government participation in the Task Force. 274 Additionally, 
national and local governments along with businesses and foundations 
could jointly fund Task Force operations, potentially through lump sum 
grants to a non-profit organization that houses and administers 
operations.275 As discussed below, formal government approval of, the 
fourth step body, along with participation by victim representatives working 
with officials, businesses, and community groups, would be essential. 
272 ld. at 66. 
273 Id. at 63. 
274 See Yamamoto et aI., supra note 24, at 43 n.203. 
275 See id. at 44. Cf Morocco Still a Model for Justice in MENA, but Questions Remain, 
INT'L CTR. TRANSITIONAL JUST. (Feb. 8, 2016), https://www.ic~.org/news/morocco-still­
model-justice-mena-questions-remain (noting that the National Council on Human Rights 
(CNDH), which is a national institution for the protection and promotion of human rights, 
is responsible for following up on the Equity and Reconciliation Commission's 
recommendations and is expected to issue a final report on the implementation of 
recommendations and unresolved cases in'2016); Danesius Marteh, Justice Experts Slate 
Ellen's TRC Report Implementation, FRONT PAGE AFRICA (Jan. 27, 2016), 
http://www.frontpageafricaonline.com/index. php/news173 43 -trans i tional-j us tice-experts-
slate-ellen-s-trc-report-implementation (stating that the Independent National Human 
Rights Commission, a government-created commis'sion, "has prime responsibility for 
implementing the Truth & Reconciliation Commissiori report"). 
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Control by a government agency, however, by locating the Task Force 
under a bureaucratic agency, would tend to impede proper functioning. 
Government officials need to participate in, but not control, Task Force 
endeavors. Achieving the delicate balance of public and private support and 
participation while ensuring a key measure of Task Force independence 
would be crucial to effective follow-up operations.276 
2. Goals 
The Task Force's five main goals would be: 
(1) building upon the truth commission's inquiry (which would 
likely have been completed earlier and possibly without all 
responsible parties' full participation) by updating and by filling 
any gaps in commission findings; 
(2) assessing the completeness, fairness, and efficacy of the truth 
commission's recommendations, particularly considering new and 
updated information and thoughtful discordant voices; 
(3) assessing the effectiveness of implementing actions already 
taken to determine what more is needed to repair the persisting 
damage (both individual and communal); 
(4) in view of (1), (2), and (3), recommending and overseeing 
concrete follow-up steps as part of a larger integrated reparative 
justice plan in light of evolving political, social, and economic 
conditions; and 
(5) fostering reparative justice in ways that benefit the survivors 
and descendants of the historic injustice, including their 
communties; that assure accountability; and that enhance the 
276 There are a number of possible organization structures for an "independent" entity. 
One that integrates government support without undue government control could be a 
non-profit organization that has operation expenses funded for a defined period by a 
government block grant-with specific additional programs supported by private 
funding. 
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democratic legitimacy of the participating governments and private 
organizations.277 
These broad goals would help a Task Force envision and guide further 
needed reparative actions in light of the "Four Rs" of social healing through 
justice-recognition, responsibility, reconstruction, and reparation. 
C. A Fourth Step in Operation 
1. Assessing Truth Commission Findings and Recommendations and 
Implementing Actions Taken 
Assessing the efficacy of truth commission recommendations is integral 
to a sense of justice done. Truth commission recommendations, usually set 
forth in a formal commission report, are the foundation for reconciliation 
initiatives.278 But, as predicted by critiques of reconciliation's 
communitarian philosophy, victims or perpetrators sometimes challenge the 
legitimacy of truth commission inquiries because they view them as either 
politically motivated or insufficiently backed by evidence.279 While 
277 See Yamamoto et aI., supra note 24, at 45. 
278 See, e.g., CHEGA! THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION FOR RECEPTION, TRUTH AND 
RECONCILIATION IN TIMOR-LESTE (CA VR) (2005), http://www.cavr-
timorieste.org/en/chegaReport.htm; After 10 Years, CA VR Report Still Resonates in 
Timor-Leste and Around the World, INT'L CTR. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (Feb. 23,2016), 
https:llwww.ictj.org/news/IO-years-cavr-report-timor-leste-truth (detailing how the 
CA VR truth commission report paved the way for an "innovative community 
reconciliation program" and contributed to grassroots peace in Timor-Leste); The 
Canadian Press, Manitoba Tables Bill to Act on Truth and Reconciliation 
Recommendations, CTV NEWS (Feb. 25, 2016), 
http://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/manitoba-tables-bill-to-act-on-truth-and-reconciliation-
recommendations-l.2793053 (indicating that the truth and reconciliation commission 
recommendations led to the Manitoba government proposing a law that would "lay a path 
toward reconciliation with Indigenous people"). 
279 See, e.g., Truth Seeking, supra note 211, at 15 (citing the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of the Democratic Republic of Congo as a truth commission perceived as 
politically motivated because the appointments to the commission occurred before the 
commission was governed by a legal statute and were dependent on political affiliations 
to the parties represented at the peace negotiations in 2002). 
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affording appropriate deference to the commission, a Task Force would 
assess the completeness of the commission's findings and 
recommendations. Input from scholars, human rights groups, businesses, 
nonprofit community organizations, and government officials would bolster 
the legitimacy of this work.280 
Reconciliation initiatives stall, sometimes abruptly, because of weak or 
incomplete truth commission recommendations.281 According to the 
International Center for Transitional Justice, "recommendations that are too 
general, not based on the actual inquiry, or lacking the support of 
authoritative technical expertise [do] not have the credibility to gamer the 
support needed for implementation.,,282 At other times, salutary interim 
recommendations are omitted from final commission recommendations.283 
At still other times, clearly appropriate recommendations-for instance, 
individual reparations for those still suffering-are missing altogether, 
undercutting the legitimacy of the overall initiative?84 Thus, a primary 
objective of a fourth step Task Force would be to assess the efficacy and 
completeness of original recommendations (and supporting findings) and 
fill gaps in light of new information. 285 
Especially important, the fourth step follow-up Task Force would then 
evaluate implemented actions to date. In particular, it might discern the 
280 See id. (emphasizing the importance of "meaningful consultation with all interested 
parties and their involvement," particularly the participation of "govemment, civil 
society, victims groups, and others who may be impacted by the work of the 
commission"). 
281 See supra Section II.B. 
282 Gonzalez et aI., supra note 26, at xii. 
283 For example, South Korea's 2005 TReK made both interim and final 
recommendations that "appear[ ed] to be in tension in many important respects," and 
many of its recommendations were inconsistent with those issued by other specialized 
South Korea truth commissions. Melish, supra note 2, at 16. 
284 See supra Section II.B. 
285 See Melish, supra note 2, at 16 (stating that "these considerations will need to be 
closely attended by advocates and other stakeholders in the implementation process 
ahead"). 
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appropriateness of reconstructive and reparative actions taken-for 
instance, apologies issued, memorials erected, educational institutions 
established, and community economic capacity-building initiated. It would 
do this assessment with an eye on actUal consequences for victims,286 
communities, and the larger society. And it would approach this task with 
fairness and balance-by commending salutary efforts, constructively 
critiquing shortcomings, and suggesting further grounded actions. 
2. Shepherding Further Implementation 
As part of that task, the fourth step Task Force could sponsor social 
science studies on cultural and economic impacts. It could monitor national 
and local governments' and private groups' participation in the 
implementation process.287 And it might regularly publish summary 
progress reports on what the government and others have and have not 
accomplished, along with suggestions for new or revised measures. 288 In 
short, the Task Force might operate as a review and reporting service to 
track implementation. 
The Task Force might also create working groups to interact with 
businesses, local officials, and community organizations to address 
politically challenging recommendations. Perhaps most important, those 
working groups would work with, lobby, or pressure executive and 
legislative branches of local and national governments to shepherd policy 
prescriptions into programs, particularly those addressing economic justice. 
More bro.adly, the Task Force might encourage governments and private 
organizations to devote resources for public education campaigns, coalesce 
survivors' stories into widely publicized public records, and facilitate 
286 See Waterhouse, supra note 19, at 267-70 (emphasizing the need to design and 
implement reparative programs from the victims' perspectives). 
287 See Yamamoto et aI., supra note 24, at 45 n.209. 
288 See Truth Seeking, supra note 211, at 67-69. 
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research on law and policy initiatives aimed at preventing future repetition 
of past abuses. 
3. Refashioning and Overseeing New Paths Forward in Light of 
Evolving Conditions 
Politics, economics, and social norms often influence the implementation 
of truth commission recommendations.289 These often-shifting realpolitik 
influences regularly reshape government policies, transform economic 
prospects, and alter public consciousness about what is right and juSt.290 
The political backdrop affects the operations and perceived legitimacy of 
the implementation process.291 Changing presidential or legislative 
leadership sometimes undermines reparative actions.292 Conflicts at home 
289 See, e.g., id. (recognizing that "key recommendations on justice, reparations and 
archives have not yet been implemented[,] ... [which] is due principally to problems 
within the parliamentary system and the politics of Timor-Leste's relationship with 
Indonesia" and that the greatest challenge to implementing the truth commission report's 
recommendations today is that the implementation of the most important 
recommendations related to human rights committed by Indonesia is "subject to the 
politics of the relationship between DiE and Jakarta"). 
290 See generally THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS (Pablo de Grieff ed., 2008) 
(addressing the importance of politics in shaping a wide range of reparations initiatives). 
291 For human rights scholar Tara Melish, "whether a truth commission is effective 
depends to a large extent upon two critical factors: (I) whether it is able to attract the 
attention of its constituents, and (2) whether the commission is perceived as legitimate 
among members of the mass public." Melish, supra note 2, at 24. See also Marteh, supra 
note 275 (addressing the politics in Liberia behind the implementation of truth and 
reconciliation report recommendations and the danger of quantifying, rather than 
providing qualitatively analyzing, implementation efforts by the government). 
292 See, e.g., San Yamin Aung, Outgoing Parliament Approves Presidential Protection, 
Immunity Bill, IRRAWADDY (Jan. 28,2016), http://www.irrawaddy.comlburma/outgoing-
parliament-approves-presidential-protection-immunity-bill.html (noting that on the last 
sitting day of the outgoing Burma Parliament, lawmakers approved the controversial 
Presidential Security Bill, which "guarantees lifetime personal security and legal 
immunity for former heads of state" and which was apparently expedited for the benefit 
of the outgoing President Thein Sein); Marteh, supra note 275 (noting that the path to 
reconciliation shifted upon the election of President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, who has 
championed national reconciliation for Liberia). 
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and abroad stall sensitive recommendations. 293 Unstable administrations, 
especially those partly responsible for historic injustices, at times halt 
implementing actions?94 Excessive control by government officials 
potentially dampens meaningful-and legitimizing-public participation.295 
With ebbing and flowing political and economic tides, the impediments to 
social healing are numerous and varied. 
For instance, according to transitional justice advocate Kim Dong-Choon, 
political constraints curtailed the implementation of the recommendations 
of South Korea's 2005 TRCK.296 Those constraints encompassed politicians 
deploying Cold War anti-communist rhetoric to justify human rights 
violations, former government officials refusing to cooperate because of 
involvement in past abuses, and military officials opposing the entire 
reconciliation undertaking. 297 
Economic upheavals also weigh heavily on policymaker efforts. 
Governments sometimes cite recessions, fluctuating markets, or pressing 
military expenditures as reasons to postpone individual payments, economic 
capacity-building, 'and institutional restructuring. 298 Careful Task Force 
293 See, e.g., Cristian Correa, From Principles to Practice: Challenges of Implementing 
Reparations for Massive Violations in Colombia, INT'L CTR. TRANSITIONAL JUST. (Oct. 
201S), 
https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICn_ Report_ ColombiaReparationsChallenges _ 20 
lS.pdf(discussing the various challenges to implementing recommendations due to the 
ongoing armed conflicts in Colombia). . 
294 See, e.g., After 10 Years, supra note 278 (noting that Timor-Leste, "for pragmatic 
reasons," prefers to both ignore the CA VR truth commission report's recommendations 
and "argue that its duty of care is being met through its social security, health, and other 
services"). 
295 See, e.g., Kim, supra note Ill, at 112-22 (indicating that the implementation ofTRCK 
recommendations mainly rested in the hands of the national government with little public 
participation). 
296 See id. 
297 See id.; see also Melish, supra note 2, at 18. 
298 For example, the International Center for Transitional Justice highlighted how the 
political and economic relationship between Timor-Leste and Indonesia has impacted 
implementation efforts as follows: 
VOLUME IS • ISSUE 1 • 2016 
176 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
evaluation of those delay claims, with an assessment of priorities, would be 
important for fashioning steps forward. 
Finally, evolving social norms also shape implementation. Increasing 
attention to gender, sexual orientation, race, and indigeneity encourages 
marginalized groups to advocate for heightened recognition and tailored 
remedies.299 Similarly, evolving concerns about environmental preservation, 
peace, and responsible economic development sometimes reshape the tenor 
and specifics of social healing.300 For instance, notions of gender redress 
now spur reparations advocacy for mass sexual violence, and environmental 
justice tenets bolster opposition to military base construction where past 
injustice awaits remediation. 301 
[I]t is important to remind ourselves that Timor-Leste has land and sea borders 
with its large neighbor [Indonesia] and, as it emerges from deep poverty and 
trauma and oil prices head south, now depends on Indonesia heavily for 
investment, educational opportunity, communications, and affordable goods 
and services. This economic relationship is being extended to military and 
other forms of cooperation. This leaves little if any wriggle room for justice 
and reparations for past crimes; both in fact are opposed by Timor-Leste's 
leaders, even though a number of high-ranking Indonesian military officers 
have been indicted by the UN-supported serious crimes process. Timor-Leste's 
policy is also a convenient fig-leaf for the international community, which also 
prioritizes good relations with Jakarta and has a vested interest in letting 
bygones be bygones. 
After 10 Years, supra note 278. 
299 See generally Pettit, supra note 61, at 278-79 (examining intersectional race-gender 
sensitive redress with a focus on sexual violence); Eric K. Yamamoto & Michele Park 
Son en, Reparations Law: Redress Bias?, in IMPLICIT BIAS ACROSS THE LAW 265 (Justin 
D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith eds., 2012) (calling for intersectional race-gender 
sensitive redress to account for implicit redress bias); Michele Park Sonen, Healing 
Multidimensional Wounds of Injustice Intersectionality and the Korean "Comfort 
Women," 22 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 269 (2012) (employing an intersectional race-
gender redress analysis for Korean comfort women). 
300 See, e.g., Yamamoto et aI., supra note 24, at 75-81 (discussing the devastating damage 
to Jeju Island's natural environment and calling for attention to economic justice). 
301 See generally id. at 68-78. 
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Because political, social, and economic conditions sometimes evolve 
rapidly during implementation, an expanded reconciliation template needs 
to anticipate and account for realpolitik shifts.302 Thus, a fourth step Task 
Force would not focus solely on assessing and implementing existing 
recommendations. It would also evaluate evolving conditions, refashion 
recommendations as needed, and oversee new social healing paths 
forward-all toward the goal of recalibrating and reinvigorating the original 
reconciliation commitment. 
To assist in that process, a fourth step Task Force might establish a 
formal Citizens' Council to better integrate local voices. That Citizens' 
Council could advise the Task ~orce about emerging environmental, 
cultural, and peace-related conditions. 303 
A fourth step Task Force might also facilitate accords or settlements, 
assuring broad stakeholder input into the tenor and substance of reparative 
agreements. Active Task Force engagement with political decision-makers 
might obviate problems of legitimacy by preventing politically expedient 
words of redress without accompanying reconstruction and reparation-for 
instance, Japan's initial apology to South Korea's World War II military sex 
slaves. 
The latest Japanese apology, which some have seen as part of a 
strategic geopolitical deal struck between Japan and South Korea, 
has led to protests among the 46 surviving South Korean victims as 
well as the victims in other countries occupied by Japan during the 
war. After working for 15 years on reparations for victims in over 
50 countries, [the International Center for Transitional Justice] 
found that many victims feel that an apology unaccompanied by 
other forms of reparation does not constitute justice, even as 
302 See supra Section II. 
303 See, e.g., Yamamoto et aI., supra note 24, at 68-78 (suggesting a similar sort of 
Citizens' Coun~il in the context of Jeju 4.3 reconciliation). 
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material reparations, such as compensation, without a meaningful 
acknowledgement of responsibility also falls short.304 
In sum, an Assessment, Implementation, and Oversight Task Force 
would serve as a practical fourth step for coalescing recognition and 
responsibility and for recalibrating and overseeing reconstructive and 
reparative actions. This implementation fourth step thus would aim to foster 
comprehensive and sustained social healing-for those harmed and their 
families in ways that also benefit communities and the larger society.305 
D. Two Partial Archetypes 
How might a fourth step Assessment, Implementation, and Oversight 
Task Force look and operate in practice? Two follow-up initiatives offer 
distinct partial archetypes. They may be viewed as distinct archetypes 
because their structures reflect two vastly differing foundational 
approaches. The first involves privately sponsored assessment and 
recalibration efforts to evaluate post-truth commission reconstruction and 
reparation. The second reflects a multifaceted initiative mainly under 
government bureaucratic control to facilitate implementation of specific 
commission recommendations. The two initiatives are partial because they 
embody practical follow-up limitations. Both initiatives are concisely 
described here not as fourth step models but as comparative bases for 
evaluating and refining the Task Force proposal. 
1. The International Center for Transitional Justice's Assessment of 
Peru's Truth and Reconciliation Process 
The International Center for Transitional Justice pioneered the 
assessment and implementation functions of a fourth step follow-up when it 
304 David Tolbert, Japan's Apology to Shows What Public Apologies Should (Not) Do, 
HUFF. POST (Jan. 29, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.comldavid-tolbertljapans-
apology-to-south-k _ b _91 1 1 566.html. 
305 See Yamamoto et aI., supra note 24, at 80-81. 
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assessed Peruvian reconciliation efforts in 2013. After Peru's violent 
conflict from 1980 to the mid-1990s, the Peruvian government initiated a 
reconciliation process that encompassed the government and armed 
opposition groupS.306 Both sides committed widespread human rights 
violations, with over 60,000 disappeared or murdered and with 
disproportionate harms' to indigenous rural peasant communities.307 
Reconciliation efforts aimed to surface this truth to facilitate economic 
justice for victims and to rebuild communities.308 The truth commission 
thus investigated socioeconomic causes of the conflict, designated limited 
initial funds for victim capacity-building, and recommended institutional 
restructuring.309 For some, this broad approach demonstrated the 
government's commitment to social healing.3lo 
306 See Cristian Correa, Reparations in Peru: From Recommendations to Implementation, 
INT'LCTR. TRANSITIONALJUST. 3-4 (2013), 
http://www.ictj.org/sites/defaultifiles/ICTJ_Report]eru_Reparations_2013.pdf.InI993. 
the Peruvian government declared victory over the Shining Path and initiated 
reconciliation efforts. See Jemima Garcia-Godos, Victim Reparations in the Peruvian 
Truth Commission and the Challenge of Historical Interpretation, 2 INT'L 1. 
TRANSITIONAL JUST. 63, 70 (2008). The legislature provided limited compensation to a 
few victims. Id. at 71. Responding in 2001 to demands for further reconciliation efforts, 
Peru's then-president and legislature established the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission and the Plan Integral de Reparaciones (PIR). Lisa J. Laplante, On the 
Indivisibility of Rights: Truth Commissions, Reparations, and the Rights to Development, 
10 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 141, 159 (2007). 
307 Correa, supra note 306, at 3. 
308 From 1980 to the mid-1990s, the Shining Path--one of the major opposition groups-
engaged in a violent armed conflict with the government. Id. at 3-4. Throughout this 
period, the government and Shining Path forcibly displaced 600,000 people and killed 
and disappeared 70,000 more. See Garcia-Godos, supra note 306, at 68. Widespread 
human rights violations by both sides included decimation of uninvolved rural 
communities, which held many indigenous inhabitants. Laplante, supra note 306, at 143; 
see Garcia-Godos, supra note 306, at 68. The conflict disproportionally harmed these 
groups and intensified Peru's painful history of subordinating indigenous peasant 
communities. See Garcia-Godos, supra note 306, at 68. 
309 The PIR investigated specific acts and resulting harms and also examined deeper 
socioeconomic causes. See Yamamoto & Mackintosh, supra note 104, at 8. See also 
Laplante, supra note 306, at 160 (noting the PIR's "components include symbolic 
reparations, attention to physical and mental health, educational opportunities, restitution 
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Despite these broad initial efforts, criticism emerged about the 
incompleteness of government implementation.3lI Critics maintained that 
because the conflict inflicted enduring damage, the reconciliation initiative 
needed a stronger emphasis on economic redress. 312 In 2011, in response to 
continued criticism, the Peruvian government announced a plan to pay 
individual reparations.313 The money allocated (less than $100 per person), 
however, seemed to "many to be too little, too late.,,314 The government 
then acknowledged that no one had been fully compensated and promised to 
complete the reparations process within ten years.315 Yet, especially for 
indigenous communities, the minimal individual reparations and the lack of 
real economic capacity-building signaled the reconciliation initiative's 
overall failure. 316 
At this juncture, the private International Center for Transitional Justice 
stepped in and conducted an extensive, independent assessment. 317 Focusing 
on reconstruction and reparation (in the broader sense of "repair"), the 
International Center's assessment evaluated the implementation of the truth 
commission's existing recommendations. 318 That assessment covered the 
and rehabilitation of citizen rights, collective reparations and individual economic 
reparations. Beneficiaries of these measures include both direct and indirect victims."). It 
recommended economic justice initiatives, including individual economic capacity-
building and payments for those directly injured and institutional reconstruction. 
Laplante, supra note 306, at 160. Part of the plan sought to address the root of the conflict 
by generating infrastructure for education, health, and jobs. Id. 
310 See Yamamoto & Mackintosh, supra note 104, at 8. 
311 See Greiff, supra note 85, at 470-71. The government then established a fund for 
education, health, and economic projects associated with the PIR. See Yamamoto & 
Mackintosh, supra note 104, at 8. These projects, however, were open to only a few. Id. 
312 See Greiff, supra note 85, at 470-71. 
313 Angel Pez, Rights-Peru: No Reparationsfor Families of Civil War Victims, 
INTERPRESS SERvo (July 27,2010), http://ipsnews.netlnews.asp?idnews=52284. 
314 Id. 
315 See Cabitza, supra note 86. 
316 See id. 
317 See Correa, supra note 306. 
318 See id. 
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recommended victims' registry, economic reparations (individual and 
collective), political changes (including recognition of civil and political 
rights), and other reparative measures (relating to education, physical and 
mental health; housing, memorials, the search for victim remains, and the 
court access for victims' civil ciaims).319 Overall, the International Cent~r's 
follow-up work, although not broadly participatory and without formal 
government approval or participation, illustrated a key aspect of the 
envisioned assessment and implementation roles of a fourth step follow-up 
Task Force.320 
As part of its assessment, the International Center worked toward an 
objective evaluation-detailing both productive steps forward and 
backsliding-of each major truth commission recommendation.32 1 It 
commended the Peruvian reconciliation initiative for taking "significant 
steps to address the severe and massive human rights violations committed 
during the country's internal conflict.,,322 And it recognized that the 
reconciliation measures "strengthen[ ed] democracy and human rights 
protections and prevent[ ed] the recurrence of violence.,,323 The assessment, 
as mentioned, also constructively critiqued constrained Peruvian 
government reparative actions, revealing salutary steps as well as salient 
omissions. 
The International Center's assessment thereby illuminated gaps in the 
Peruvian government's efforts. Notably, the assessment shed light on the 
319 See generally id. By 2012, the victims' registry had registered 160,429 individual 
victims, 7,678 communities, and 32 organizations of displaced people. Id. at 10. The 
International Center's assessment group commended the victims' registry for its "flexible 
guidelines for evaluating different types of violations eligible for re'parations" and for its 
efforts to make its services accessible to people in rural areas, Id. at 9. But the assessment 
group also noted that not all of the people registered would qualifY for compensation, 
leaving the "unqualified" feeling left out and ignored. Id. 
320 See generally id. 
321 See id. 
322 See id. 
323 See id. 
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government's "trend of providing isolated measures" to address systematic 
abuses. 324 It observed that as a result of the government's piecemeal efforts, 
"reparations will lack the comprehensiveness that the Truth Commission 
recommended and that the Reparations Law and its implementing decree 
envisioned.,,325 Most important, in uplifting perspectives of those suffering, 
the International Center identified a glaring reparations gap between victim 
expectations and government actions.326 "Victims must still continue to wait 
- even after having suffered a serious violation sometimes twenty or more 
years ago and having navigated the long victim-registration process to 
finally achieve some recognition) as right bearers .... [t]his process is 
inconsistent with the message that a reparations policy should carry.,,327 
Overall, the International Center called for full implementation of original 
truth commission recommendations.328 It also pointed toward additional 
actions needed to further reconciliation efforts, including better 
accommodation of indigenous communities' voices and needs.329 
The International Center thus articulated compelling critiques of the 
social healing process, both salutary dimensions and failings. 33o In doing so, 
it highlighted the assessment and implementation functions of a fourth step 
mechanism, spelling out what governments, independent researchers, 
scholars, advocates, human rights organizations, businesses, and community 
advocates might undertake as primary follow-up steps. 
Yet, the International Center stated some of its recommendations 
subtly.33! Political realities may have counseled caution in proactively 
generating pointed directives. The International Center, without active 
324 See id. 
325 See id. 
326 See id. 
327 See id. 
328 See generally id. 
329 Id. 
330 Id. 
331 !d. 
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government participation and formal oversight authority, lacked the power 
to guide follow-through prescriptions for needed reconstruction and 
reparation.332 
2. South Korea TRCK's Follow-up Board 
In contrast with the International Center's assessment, the South Korea 
TRCK's follow-up mechanism entailed substantial government 
involvement. But extensive government agency control and changes in 
national political leadership likely dampened or even undermined follow-up 
efforts. 
South Korea's TRCK policymakers and administrators contemplated two 
follow-up bodies for implementing specific recommendations. 333 First, 
within the TRCK, policymakers created a "Reconciliation Committee ... to 
administer reconciliation and memorial efforts, establish a road-map for 
settling the past, investigate psychological damages and development of 
review programs for reconciliation, and to search for methods to improve 
recommendations for each individual case.,,334 Second, the TRCK's 
Framework Act contemplated a government administrative 
Recommendations Follow-up Board.335 The Act, however, did not bestow 
upon the follow-up board the authority to implement commission 
JJ2 [d. 
JJJ Melish, supra note 2, at 24 (citing the Framework Act for the 2005 TRCK and its 
Three Year Plan). 
JJ4 See generally THREE YEAR REPORT, supra note 233. 
JJ5 The Framework Act provided that "any case approved for investigation must be 
reported to the Recommendation Follow-up Board on measures for restoration of the 
victims' honor, reconciliation of the victims and offenders, the prevention of incident 
repetition, the revision, abolishment, or creation of related laws, policies, and practices, 
and the education and promotion for building historical consciousness." Framework Act 
on Clearing up Past Incidents for Truth and Reconciliation, Law No. 7542, Article 34, 
paragraph 4, May 31,2005 [hereinafter Framework Act], reprinted in THREE YEAR 
REPORT, supra note 233, translation available at 
http://www.jinsil.go.kr/EnglishiInformationilegallread.asp?num=7 6&pageno= 1 &stype= 
& sval=&data_years=20 12&data _ month=. 
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recommendations. South Korea's legislative and executive branches 
retained contro1.336 And supervisory agencies lacked any legal and systemic 
duty to implement recommendations. 337 
To activate the Framework Act's plan for implementation, South Korea's 
president issued a presidential decree for "Regulations on the Establishment 
and Operation of the Recommendations Follow-Up Board.,,338 The decree 
officially created the Recommendations Follow-up Board-a high-level 
interagency system for implementing specific TReK recommendations.339 
This envisioned follow-up administrative body was placed initially under 
the Office of the Prime Minister and later under the Ministry of Public 
Administration and Security.34o The body was comprised of several 
committees tasked with managing the implementation of TReK 
recommendations, including drafting implementation agenda, reviewing 
progress, and announcing results.341 
The board would adhere to a firm timeline for specific action. 342 In 
response to TReK recommended measures, the board would interact with 
the heads of government agencies. 343 These political administrators would 
generate implementation plans and submit them to the board.344 
The board would transmit the implementation plans to a working 
committee,345 led by the Vice Minister of Public Administration and 
336 THREE YEAR REpORT, supra note 233, at 32. 
337 Id. at 32. 
338 Presidential Decree No. 195, Aug. 27, 2007, reprinted in THREE YEAR REpORT, supra 
note 233, at 107. 
339 Melish, supra note 2, at 24 (citing the Framework Act for the 2005 TReK and its 
Three Year Plan). 
340 THREE YEAR REPORT, supra note 233, at 107. 
341 Id. at 32. 
342 I d. 
343 [d. at 33. 
344 Id. 
345 Id. 
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Security and comprised of high-ranking officials of related ministries. 346 
This working committee would further refine the implementation agenda.347 
During preliminary deliberations, TRCK members could provide input. 348 
The working committee would then pass the implementation agenda to a 
"Deliberation Council," led by the Minister of Public Administration and 
Security and comprised of vice ministers of related ministries.349 The 
Council would hold quarterly meetings to update government actors of 
implementation tasks.350 
The Recommendations Follow-Up Board thus would work with 
government leaders and specific government agencies to facilitate 
implementation of specific TRCK recommendations. It would notify the 
TRCK about progress. 35 ! Overall, the board and TRCK would collaborate to 
"regularly examine and analyze the planning and implementation processes 
of recommendations in order to revise inefficiencies in the relevant policies, 
systems, or procedures. ,,352 
Despite the carefully calibrated structure and timeline, the board's 
implementing operations stalled. The Recommendations Follow-Up Board 
. initially received 49 findings and recommendations from the TRCK for 
implementation. 353 According to former TRCK Standing Commissioner 
Kim Dong-Choon, "despite the creation of these new [follow-up] 
institutions, implementation of the TRCK's recommendations has been 
slow and highly uneven.,,354 He noted that the government implemented 
"relatively easy measures-those not politically sensitive or financially 
346 I d. 
347 Id. 
348 Id. 
349 I d. 
350Id. 
351ld. 
352 I d. at 112. 
353 Kim, supra note Ill, at 113. 
354 Id. 
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burdensome.,,355 Other and more significant recommendations-the 
revision of historical records, compensation of damages, and peace and 
human rights education-remained untouched. 356 
Although promising in theory, with its multi-tiered bureaucratic structure, 
the Follow-up Board apparently proved ineffective in practice. The 
interagency implementation system, operated entirely by government 
actors, largely avoided difficult, important recommendations and failed at 
"directly involving petitioners or other concerned stakeholders in the 
monitoring and implementation process.,,357 The ebbs and flows of the 
national government's political will and government officials' control over 
the Follow-up Board and its committees undermined active victim and 
community participation. In short, the follow-up mechanism lacked 
sufficient independence to function as a collaborative body that included 
government participation in, but not full control over, the process. 
Indeed, when President Lee Myung-bak's conservative party assumed 
power in 2008, the TReK and the Follow-up Board faced increasing 
roadblocks. 358 TReK supporters blamed this shift in political power for the 
Follow-up Board's ineffectiveness and eventual dissolution, 359 asserting 
that President Lee's administration was "uncomfortable with the scrutiny of 
the country's past" and wanted the TReK "shut down.,,36o The TReK 
dissolved in 2010.361 The Follow-Up Board also significantly scaled back 
its work and apparently later disbanded, leaving many important 
355 [d. 
356 [d. 
357 Melish, supra note 2, at 46. 
358 Ashley Rowland & Hwang Hae-rym, Time Running Out on South Korea's Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, STARS & STRIPES (Jan. 19,2010), 
http://www.stripes.comlnews/time-running-out-on-south-korea-s-truth-and-
reconciliation-commission-l.98156. 
359 !d. 
360 !d. 
361 [d. Rising tensions with North Korea may have also shifted the South Korea 
government's attention away from addressing past government injustices. [d. 
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recommendations, especially those politically or financially sensitive, as 
"unfinished business. ,,362 
E. Structurally Integrating Government and Civil Society 
Just as too much, or sole, government control over implementation bodes 
ill for genuine social healing, so too does too little government involvement. 
Public participation is crucial, but as integral component, not as sole mover. 
With the government-controlled TRCK follow-up experience partly in 
mind, some scholars focus on public participation as the primary component 
of an implementation fourth step. Justice scholars John Ciorciari and Jaya 
Ramji-Nogales view civil society as "unofficial implementing agencies" of 
truth commission recommendations. 363 Professor Tara Melish predicts that 
organizations comprising "civil society" could find ways to "construct, 
monitor, and police an accountability framework in which concrete 
responsibilities can be distributed among stakeholders, who can then be 
held answerable for following through on their commitments.,,364 
In essence, rather than a formal implementation body, Ciorciari, Nogales, 
and Melish suggest that unofficial civil society "agencies" might serve as 
the critical follow-up fourth step in the reconciliation process, apparently 
through lobbying, consciousness raising, and strategic pressuring of 
government decision-makers. Without this kind of engagement, "political 
resistance and entrenched interests will ensure that reforms are superficial if 
362 There appears to be no English paper trail for the Recommendations Follow-Up 
Board. The current Ministry of Public Administration and Security's website does not 
mention or have any archival material on the Recommendations Follow-Up Board or its 
involvement in the TRCK implementation process. There appears to be no mention of the 
Recommendations Follow-Up Board in English beyond the last TRCK report published 
in 2007. Much of the account in this article about the Follow-Up board is drawn from 
Kim, supra note Ill, at 113. 
363 John D. Ciorciari & Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Lessons/rom the Cambodian Experience 
with Truth and Reconciliation, 19 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 193,194 (2012). 
364 Melish, supra note 2, at 63. 
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undertaken at aU.,,365 By contrast, active civil society control would shape 
reparative actions according to real community needs and priorities. 366 In 
this way, civil society would help translate high expectations into concrete 
implementation plans and actions. 367 
The civil society approach aptly highlights the essential participation of 
non-governmental organizations, community advocates, journalists, and the 
general populace. And political organizing is critical for raising public 
consciousness and applying pressure for official responses.368 But 
experience shows public engagement is not enough after a commission 
makes recommendations to compel needed implementation.369 
A generally stated civil society approach to implementation370 appears to 
leave unaddressed four realities about post-commission follow-up. First, it 
assumes that civil society would find ways to coalesce around 
implementation without an overarching organizing authority.371 Second, it 
365 See id. at 23. 
366 See id. at 64. 
367 For example, public organizations and community groups would have a pivotal role in 
providing continued "effective support to victims who may find the truth-seeking process 
an onerous and challenging journey." Gonzalez et aI., supra note 26, at x. 
368 See generally Gonzalez et aI., supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
369 See supra Sections I1.B. & ULA (describing unimplemented truth commission 
recommendations). Reasons may vary for lesser sustained post-commission collective 
efforts for implementation-people have already been given a recognized voice through 
public hearings; causes have been investigated; some recommendations have been acted 
upon; collective political energy is directed elsewhere. This subject warrants further 
inquiry. 
370 That lack of specificity may simply reflect a primary focus on the idea of the need for 
an implementing mechanism. 
371 Melish suggests generally that implementation of recommendations by a "permanent 
follow-up body" is "fundamentally a responsibility of all social stakeholders, responsibly 
supported by the international community and other human rights actors across the 
globe." Melish, supra note 200, at 315. Melish's suggestion delegates the bulk of 
responsibility for implementation to civil society (although undefined, this apparently 
means mainly non-governmental organizations, media watch-dogs and community 
activists) without fully accounting for the important role of government officials and 
private businesses. See id. More specifically, Melish anticipates that individuals and non-
governmental organizations that comprise civil society will unite on their own to 
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downplays the need for structure-effective monitoring and policing 
require organization, coordination, and regular funding, both for operations 
and for oversight, including some form of government participation.372 
Third, it looks past the need for stature-recognition or even legal standing 
with policymakers, bureaucrats, businesses, and community groups helps 
transform plans into actions, particularly those tapping the public fiSC.:i73 
And fourth, it assumes that a loosely organized civil society, without a 
strong organizational structure, can function effectively as a follow-up 
implementation body that is accountable for its actions (and inactions).374 
undertake implementing and oversight actions without an overarching organizing and 
funding authority. See id. But mutual engagement by all, especially by those governments 
formerly complicit in or directly responsible for historic injustices, would be essential to 
a achieving a sense of "justice done." 
372Government representatives, as well as scholars and private business and public 
institutional representatives, would need to collaborate with civil society representatives 
in creating, operating, and partially funding a fourth-step mechanism. Their participation 
would also be essential to devising and carrying out implementation and oversight 
activities and ensuring that each stakeholder assumes appropriate financial and 
substantive responsibility. A crucial structural piece of the implementing and oversight 
body would be shared power so that government participation contributes to but does not 
control agendas and tasks. 
373 Melish's approach overlooks the need for formal recognition and some degree of legal 
standing of a follow-up body with policymakers, 'administrators, and the public, which 
would be essential to prospects of actualizing responsibility for assessment, 
implementation, refashioning and oversight actions. The potential for civil society 
programs, protests, and journalist exposes would be an important part of the mix. But 
experiences in many venues show that they might be effective in challenging illegitimate 
authority but are not, alone, nearly enough to fashion and administer concrete steps 
toward reconstruction and reparation. See. e.g., Matthew Vadum, George Soros Funds 
Occupy Wall Street, HUMAN EVENTS (Oct. 21, 201 1), 
http://humanevents.coml20 11/1 0/2I1george-soros-funds-occupy-wall-streetl (referencing 
the organizational and funding problems with the social movement, Occupy Wall Street). 
Government and private sector representatives would also contribute to tempering the 
political and economic forces that otherwise, 'at times, impede reconciliation efforts. 
Victims and community advocates would playa central collaborative role. And 
responsibility, essential to social healing through justice, would be appropriately 
attributed to key stakeholders in ways that enhance democratic legitimacy. 
374 The idea that civil society would function as a follow-up mechanism imbues "civil 
society" with a structure that does not exist. A fourth step follow-up would likely be a 
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The envisioned fourth step Assessment, Implementation, and Oversight 
Task Force would embrace active civil society participation but not rely 
primarily upon it. Rather, a Task Force would aim to integrate participation 
by civil society organizations at all stages of its implementation work and 
look to those organizations for generating public input and support. 
Moreover, the Task Force's operating structure would not replicate the 
TReK follow-up board's near-full control by political leaders and 
bureaucrats. But it also would not jettison government participation, instead 
favoring active involvement without overriding control. The Task Force 
would build in a crucial mix of interested participants not only to uplift 
varying perspectives but also to provide checks and balances. That balance 
of power would need to be carefully calibrated at the outset in the Task 
Force's originating structure. 
The Task Force, then, would be informed less by a pure communitarian 
ethos than by a realpolitik sense that social healing is a multi-faceted, often 
conflictual struggle that entails continual recalibration and reinvigoration-
but a struggle nevertheless worth the candle for those still suffering, their 
communities, and the larger society. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The aim of this article's proposed integrated Assessment, 
ImpletI}entation, and Oversight Task Force is not to fashion a cure-all for 
reconciliation ills. Rather, its aim is to squarely address what is currently 
missing from stalled or incomplete reconciliation initiatives almost 
everywhere: a fourth step implementation bridge over the chasm between 
aspiration and realization. 
specific, cognizable body that not only "speaks and acts" with authority but would also 
be accountable for its actions and inactions. The diverse and diffuse aspects of "civil 
society" would therefore participate through this fourth-step assessment, implementation, 
and oversight body, but primary or sole reliance on civil society would not be 
pragmatically effective. 
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It might be a pathway over the "institutionalized attempts to frustrate the 
goals and functionality of the truth commission" of South Korea.375 Or a 
route forward for sorely disappointed indigenous Peruvians demanding 
"badly needed and long-delayed economic justice" after minimalist follow 
through on truth commission reparations recommendations. 376 Or a 
spotlight on South Africa government's and businesses' choice not to 
"follow through on commission recommendations," compromising not only 
the "commission's contributions but the very process [or reconciliation] 
itself.,,377 Or a portal to self-determination for the United States to "make 
right the wrong" to Native Hawaiians by fulfilling its long-standing 
commitment to reconciliation that "has been thus far denied.,,378 
In these and other ways reconciliation's needed assessment, 
implementation, and oversight fourth step, in concept and in practice, 
potentially channels often-fractious political and social interests further 
down a mutually beneficial path toward social healing through justice. 
375 See supra Sections lII.A, IV.B and V.C & D (describing the South Korea Truth and 
. Reconciliation Commission process and impacts). 
376 See Melish, supra note 2. 
371 See supra notes 5 and 6 and accompanying text. 
378 See supra notes 7, 8, and 39 and accompanying text. 
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